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THE STATES, A PLATE, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: THE “CHOOSE LIFE” SPECIALTY 
LICENSE PLATE AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
If the phrase “Choose Life” sounds vaguely familiar to you, you may 
have read it on the road. Though simple, the phrase is stirring significant 
controversy because it appears on state-owned, driver-selected specialty 
license plates.1 Currently, drivers in seventeen states can decorate their 
vehicles with “Choose Life” plates.2 In many states, the “Choose Life” 
plates depict the crayon-sketched, smiling faces of a boy and girl and the 
words “Choose Life” in wobbly print across the top or bottom.3 Two 
states, Hawaii and Montana, offer both a “Choose Life” plate and a pro-
choice plate.4  
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Tom Brejcha, Editorial, License to Speak; “Choose Life” Plates Promote 
Adoptions, Spur Healthy Debate, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2007, at 10A; Dahlia Lithwick, Poetic 
Licenses: Are “Choose Life” License Plates Free Speech or State-Sponsored Infomercials?, SLATE, 
Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2078247/ (“[I]t’s probably safe to say that a ‘Choose Life’ tidal 
wave—and its litigation backlash—is poised to hit the nation.”); Harry Reynolds, Editorial, State 
Shouldn’t Waste Money, Time Fighting ‘Choose Life’ Plates, JOURNAL GAZETTE-TIMES COURIER 
ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.jg-tc.com/articles/2007/02/02/opinion/columns/column001.txt 
(“From a practical standpoint, I don’t understand why the State of Illinois is wasting taxpayer money 
going to court to try to suppress a specialty license plate as innocuous as ‘Choose Life.’”); Editorial, 
License to Offend, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2007, at C22.  
 2. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
and Tennessee. See Choose Life Newsletter, http://www.choose-life.org/newsletter.html (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2007) (listing states where “Choose Life” plates have been approved).  
 In South Dakota and Hawaii, the “Choose Life” logotype is actually a “decal” sticker to be placed 
in the corner of an “organizational” specialty plate with a standard background. See Choose Life, 
http://www.sdchoose-life.org (last visited Aug. 18, 2007); Organization License Plate/Decal Program, 
 http://www.co.honolulu.hi.us/csd/vehicle/mvdecal.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).  
 3. For a picture, see Choose Life, Inc. Homepage, http://www.choose-life.org/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2007). A few plates are unique. For example, on Louisiana’s plate, the state bird, the pelican, 
appears in a red heart carrying a bundled child. See Choose Life Louisiana, http://www.chooselifela. 
org/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). Tennessee’s plate features a laughing baby. See 
Tennessee.gov, Department of Revenue, http://www.tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/misc/ 
miscdesc.htm (last visited July 29, 2007).  
 4. The pro-choice plate in Montana proclaims “Pro family, Pro Choice.” See Montana 
Department of Justice, Service Organizations and Associations Plate Designs and Fees, 
http://www.doj.mt.gov/driving/platedesign/serviceorganizations.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
Hawaii has a “Respect Choice” plate. See Organization License Plate/Decal Program, http://www.co. 
honolulu.hi.us/csd/vehicle/mvdecal.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2007). 
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As a specialty plate, “Choose Life” raises funds for the pro-life cause.5 
The plate has generated over eight million dollars6 since its first 
appearance on Florida vehicles in 2000.7 Although states have different 
ways of creating “Choose Life” plates,8 their revenue-raising function is 
similar across states. Drivers pay an additional fee for the plate, which 
flows, in whole or part, to pregnancy resource centers, nonprofit 
organizations which counsel women facing stressful pregnancies to choose 
adoption rather than abortion.9 Organizations that perform or recommend 
abortions are sometimes expressly excluded from receiving “Choose Life” 
revenues.10  
 
 
 5. In this Note, the term “specialty license plates” refers to license plates which display a unique 
picture or phrase above, below, or to the side of the alphanumeric sequence and which are available to 
drivers for an additional fee. The fee, or a portion thereof, benefits organizations identified with the 
picture or phrase displayed on the plate.  
 Other types of nonstandard license plates exist throughout the states. “Vanity” or “personalized” 
plates display a driver-selected alphanumeric sequence, such as “IGVHUGS,” which is available only 
to the applicant driver. The state typically retains the additional fee in full. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 320.0805 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1135.4 (West 2005). Honorary plates are 
available only to individuals who submit proof of an award or status and, in some cases, do not cost an 
additional fee. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-4-235 to -240 (2006) (creating free, honorary plates for 
former prisoners of war, disabled veterans, and military award recipients).  
 6. Choose Life, Inc. estimates total revenues of $8,095,839 from all states as of September 30, 
2007. Choose Life Newsletter, http://www.choose-life.org/newsletter.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).  
 7. The idea for the “Choose Life” plate originated with a Florida County Commissioner, Randy 
Harris, as he was driving one day in 1996. Choose Life, Inc., About Us, http://www.choose-
life.org/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). He incorporated the nonprofit organization Choose 
Life, Inc., organized a grassroots effort, and promoted the idea to state legislators. Choose Life, Inc., 
Choose Life Story, http://www.choose-life.org/story.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). The Florida 
legislature passed a “Choose Life” bill in 1998, but it was vetoed by former governor Lawton Chiles. 
Id. Newly elected in 1999, Governor Jeb Bush signed a second bill into law. Id.  
 8. See infra Part I for a discussion of specialty plate creation models.  
 9. Denise M. Burke, Pregnancy Resource Centers: On the Frontline in the Cause for Life, 
DEFENDING LIFE 2007 151–52 (2007), available at http://www.aul.org/xm_client/client_documents/ 
DL07/abortion/DL07-PregnancyResourceCentersAndMap.pdf. For example, in Oklahoma twenty 
dollars of the thirty-five dollar fee flows to nonprofit pregnancy resource centers. See Oklahoma 
Choose Life License Plate, http://www.ecognizant.net/okchooselife/ (last visited July 28, 2007). Sixty 
percent of the money is used to provide goods and services for the women, including food, clothing 
and transportation, and forty percent funds counselor training and materials. Id. See also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 55-4-306 (2006) (providing for a portion of “Choose Life” revenues to go to New Life 
Resources, an organization which provides “counseling” and “financial assistance” to pregnant women 
in Tennessee).  
 Oklahoma’s “Choose Life” plate (and its “Adoption Creates Families” plate) is currently 
embroiled in litigation. Recently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on subject 
matter jurisdiction grounds of the claim by a nonprofit pregnancy counseling center that the state 
unconstitutionally discriminated against the pro-choice viewpoint in offering specialty license plates. 
Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1241–42, 1262 (10th Cir. 2007). However, the Tenth Circuit remanded 
the organization’s claim that the statute’s express prohibition of funds from flowing to organizations 
which counseled abortion represented an “unconstitutional condition.” Id. at 1242, 1262. The plaintiff 
organization counseled women regarding both adoption and abortion. Id. at 1241.  
 10. Burke, supra note 9, at 151. See also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(F)(2) (2006).  
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Although the message “Choose Life” unequivocally indicates support 
for the pro-life side of the abortion debate, the right to abortion is not at 
issue when federal courts are brought into the controversy. Courts have 
disposed of “Choose Life” plate cases on three grounds:11 standing,12 
federal subject matter jurisdiction,13 and constitutionality on the merits.14 
Not only is there a tripartite trail of federal precedent on the “Choose 
Life” plate, but courts ruling on the merits also disagree with each other. 
The constitutional provision implicated is the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause, which protects individual freedom of speech against 
governmental abridgement.15 Two types of state actions with respect to the 
 
 
 11. In addition, two courts have rendered decisions on procedural grounds, allowing the cases to 
proceed, and a third lawsuit has been filed. See Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, No. 05-0567-
CV, 05-1979-CV, 169 Fed. Appx. 637 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2006) (denying qualified immunity to state 
officials sued by a nonprofit organization for denying its application to sponsor a “Choose Life” plate); 
Children First Found., Inc. v. Legreide, No. 04-2137 (MLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28703 (D. N.J. 
Nov. 17, 2005) (denying state officials’ request for abstention of federal jurisdiction pending 
resolution of a question in state court and the state officials’ motion for interlocutory appeal to the 
federal appellate court); Alliance Defense Fund, Mo. Pro-Life Organization Challenges Ban on 
“Choose Life” License Plates, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/pressrelease.aspx?cid=3769 
(announcing pro-life group’s initiation of lawsuit against Missouri for denying the group’s application 
to sponsor a “Choose Life” plate) (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).  
 12. Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge issuance of a “Choose Life” plate is unsettled because courts 
have struggled to determine whether a plaintiff has actually suffered injury, and if so, whether it may 
be judicially redressed. The Eleventh Circuit held that a pro-choice organization challenging Florida’s 
“Choose Life” statute had no injury in fact because the group had not actually sought a pro-choice 
plate from the state. Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 946 (11th Cir. 2003). 
Moreover, even if an injury existed, an injunction of the statute would not provide redress. Effective 
relief would require offering state funds to the plaintiff group rather than simply “level[ing] the 
playing field” by cutting off funds to the “Choose Life” beneficiaries. Id. at 948.  
 In disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff was not required 
actually to request a pro-choice plate. Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 
2004). The court also held that “level playing field analysis” of redressability was appropriate under 
the First Amendment. Id. at 790–91. For more detailed discussion of the standing question, see Jeremy 
T. Barry, Comment, Licensing a Choice: “Choose Life” Specialty License Plates and Their 
Constitutional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605, 1612–21 (2002); Susan V. Stromberg, Comment, 
Advice to a Potential Litigant: How to Challenge the Constitutionality of the “Choose Life” Specialty 
License Plate, 33 STETSON L. REV. 623, 630–38 (2004). 
 13. Courts have held that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) removes “Choose Life” plate cases from 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. The TIA directs federal courts not to enjoin the 
collection of a state tax where a “plain, speedy, and efficient” remedy is available in state court. 28 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). The Tenth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Northern District of Ohio have held that 
the additional amount charged for the “Choose Life” plate is a “tax” under the TIA. See Hill, 478 F.3d 
at 1236; Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005); NARAL Pro-Choice Ohio v. Taft, No. 
1:05 CV 1064, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21394 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2005).  
 14. See infra Part III for discussion of these cases.  
 15. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. (emphasis added). Although at least one constitutional claim has been raised under the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause is the center of most constitutional challenges. See 
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“Choose Life” plate have been challenged under the First Amendment: 
offering a “Choose Life” plate without a counterpart pro-choice plate16 
(which will be referred to as a “solo ‘Choose Life’ plate” throughout this 
Note) and refusing to offer the “Choose Life” plate.17 Courts must decide 
whether the contested state action implicates individual free speech or 
whether the action is properly considered “government speech.” The 
Fourth18and Sixth Circuits19 and federal district courts in Illinois,20 
Arizona,21 and Louisiana22 have considered the constitutionality of state 
actions regarding the “Choose Life” plate.23  
Plaintiffs in “Choose Life” plate cases, whether challenging a plate’s 
issuance or denial, raise the free speech question by alleging viewpoint 
discrimination: that the state abridged their freedom of speech by 
suppressing the expression of their viewpoint on an issue.24 States have 
defended viewpoint-based decisions to offer or to deny the “Choose Life” 
plate as “government speech.” The government speech doctrine holds that 
 
 
Women’s Emergency Network, 323 F.3d at 945 (rejecting on standing grounds plaintiff’s argument that 
distribution of revenues from Florida’s “Choose Life” plate to Catholic Charities violated the 
Establishment Clause).  
 16. See, e.g., ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2005); Rose, 361 F.3d at 787–88.  
 17. See, e.g., Choose Life of Ill. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
19, 2007); Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, No. CV-03-1691-PHX-PGR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at 
*1–5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005).  
 18. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 at 800 (invalidating South Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate offered without 
a pro-choice counterpart).  
 19. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (upholding Tennessee’s “Choose Life” plate offered without a 
pro-choice counterpart). 
 20. White, 2007 WL 178455, at *9 (holding that Illinois’ refusal to offer “Choose Life” plate was 
unconstitutional).  
 21. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at 31 (holding that Arizona’s refusal to offer “Choose 
Life” plate was constitutional). The decision in Stanton was appealed, and the Ninth Circuit recently 
heard oral arguments. See Mike Sunnucks, State, Anti-Abortion Groups Battle Over “Choose Life” 
Plates, PHOENIX BUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 16, 2007, http://phoenix.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/ 
2007/10/15/daily23.html.   
 22. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D.L.A. 2003) (enjoining legislative specialty 
plate scheme), rev’d, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision on the ground that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2005).  
 23. In addition, one district court has considered the constitutionality of a state’s entire specialty 
plate system, challenged by an organization whose application for a “Choose Life” plate was rejected. 
Women’s Resource Network v. Gourley, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2004). However, rather than 
challenge this rejection as viewpoint discriminatory, the plaintiff organization sought to enjoin 
California from issuing any more specialty plates and sought to invalidate existing statutes providing 
for specialty plates. See id. at 1147–48. The court enjoined California from issuing any new specialty 
plates but upheld existing specialty plate statutes. Id. at 1154–55, 1157–61.  
 24. See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text for a fuller explanation of viewpoint 
discrimination. In brief, viewpoint discrimination is when the government restricts the speech of 
individuals based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.” 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/4
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there is no constitutional violation when a governmental entity espouses a 
particular viewpoint as its own and favors it above competing views.25 The 
two appellate courts to reach the First Amendment question differed in 
their view of the applicability of government speech in the context of a 
solo “Choose Life” plate.26 Faced with challenged refusals to offer the 
plate, the district courts to consider the merits also diverged in their 
analyses of government speech.27 As a result, South Carolina’s “Choose 
Life” plate was struck down, while Tennessee’s was upheld.28 Arizona 
was allowed to refuse the plate, while Illinois was ordered to begin 
production.29  
This Note will consider whether a state that acts on the basis of the 
“Choose Life” viewpoint—either by offering a solo “Choose Life” plate or 
by refusing to offer the plate—may constitutionally justify its action as 
government speech. Part I will describe the origin of “Choose Life” plates, 
illustrating the basic models of specialty plate creation in the states. Part II 
will explain the Supreme Court cases which form the constitutional 
backdrop of the “Choose Life” dispute, highlighting the tension between 
the viewpoint neutrality principle of the First Amendment’s public forum 
doctrine and the evolving doctrine of government speech. Part III will 
examine recent “Choose Life” plate cases and discuss the courts’ analyses 
of the government speech question. Part VI will critique the courts’ 
analyses in light of Supreme Court precedent regarding government 
speech and public forum. Part V will propose a “forum-accountability” 
principle by which to determine the proper application of the government 
speech doctrine in the “Choose Life” context. This principle holds that 
government speech should apply to a state’s viewpoint-based action 
regarding the “Choose Life” plate only if the state’s specialty license plate 
scheme does not amount to a speech forum and the state’s action clearly 
 
 
 25. See infra Part II for a discussion of the government speech doctrine. It has been summarized 
as “the principle that the government can speak for itself.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).  
 26. Compare Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376–77, 380 (upholding plate as government speech), with 
Rose, 361 F.3d at 794, 799–800 (rejecting government speech argument and invalidating plate). See 
discussion of these cases infra Part III. 
 27. Compare Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *17, *31 (holding that state’s specialty 
plates represented government speech and upholding refusal to offer plate), with White, 2007 WL 
178455, at *7, *9 (holding that state’s specialty plates represented a private speech forum and 
invalidating refusal to offer plate). See discussion of these cases infra Part III.  
 28. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Bredesen, 
441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). See infra Part III for discussion of these cases.  
 29. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 
2007); Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005).  See infra 
Part III for discussion of these cases. 
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communicates a discernible message for which it can be held politically 
accountable. Part V will also apply the proposed principle to a state with a 
hybrid specialty plate creation model.  
I. “CHOOSE LIFE” PLATES IN THE STATES: SPECIALTY PLATE CREATION 
MODELS 
While “Choose Life” plates have a similar function and appearance 
across state lines, their creation processes may vary. Three conceptual 
models of specialty plate creation exist: the “legislative” model, the 
“administrative” model, and a hybrid of the two.30 In the legislative model, 
the state legislature enacts a specific statutory provision for each specialty 
plate.31 A member, either of his own initiative or at the request of private 
organization, sponsors a bill or amendment describing the plate, setting its 
price, and appropriating its expected revenues. In the administrative 
model, the state legislature enacts a generic “specialty plate” statute, 
setting forth a process by which qualifying organizations may apply to a 
designated state agency to initiate production of a new plate.32 Typically, 
organizations must be nonprofit and promote community welfare to 
qualify. In some states, the specialty state creation process blends 
legislative and administrative elements into a hybrid model.33 Montana 
and Tennessee provide an instructive comparison of the legislative and 
administrative models. A hybrid model will be illustrated in Part V. C. 
In 2001, the Montana legislature passed the Montana Generic Specialty 
License Plate Act.34 The statute allows private organizations and 
governmental bodies to design and sponsor a specialty plate by applying to 
a state agency.35 Sponsor organizations must be nonprofit and operate 
primarily to promote “public health, education, or general welfare.”36 The 
agency may reject an application only on statutory grounds, which must be 
stated in writing.37 An approved plate will not be manufactured until a 
 
 
 30. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The 
Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 434–41 (2001) (drawing a distinction 
between specialty plates created by legislative action and specialty plates created by administrative 
action).  
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 45–54 for an illustration of the legislative model.  
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 34–44 for an illustration of the administrative model. 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 330–42 for an illustration of the hybrid model.  
 34. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3-472 to -481 (2005).  
 35. § 473. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/4
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$4000 reimbursement fee is paid by the sponsor or four hundred prepaid 
driver applications are received.38  
The statute also lays out guidelines for plate design. The display of a 
name, phrase, or graphic must not be offensive, advertise a good or 
service, or infringe intellectual property rights.39 In addition, a sponsor 
may propose a “donation fee” to be paid by drivers selecting the plate,40 
the entirety of which is remitted to the sponsor.41 The state of Montana 
charges an additional fee of fifteen dollars, which flows to its county and 
state general funds.42 In 2004, Montana Right to Life was approved to 
sponsor the “Choose Life” plate.43 Planned Parenthood sponsors a “Pro 
Family, Pro Choice” plate.44  
In contrast to Montana, Tennessee has no administrative process 
allowing private organizations to initiate the production of specialty 
license plates. Instead, they are created by legislative enactments which 
describe the plates and allocate their revenues.45 A Tennessee statute 
classifies the various types of nonstandard plates.46 “Specialty earmarked” 
and “new specialty earmarked” plates (collectively, “earmarked plates”) 
raise revenue enabling nonprofit organizations and government entities “to 
fulfill a specific purpose or to accomplish a specific goal.”47 In order for a 
new earmarked plate to be created, an enabling statute must be passed.48 
The enabling statute may specifically name the beneficiary of the plate’s 
revenues and may restrict the beneficiary’s use of the funds.49 Many 
enabling statutes provide for plates to be designed “in consultation” with 
the beneficiary organization.50 The Tennessee Commissioner of Safety 
 
 
 38. § 478.  
 39. § 475.  
 40. § 475.  
 41. § 480. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Choose Life Newsletter, supra note 6.   
 44. Montana Department of Justice, Service Organizations and Associations Plate Designs and 
Fees, http://www.doj.mt.gov/driving/platedesign/serviceorganizations.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).  
 45. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-277 (2006) (creating plate to benefit the Tennessee 
Wildlife Federation); § 55-4-268 (creating plate to benefit Mothers Against Drunk Driving); § 55-4-
254 (creating plate to benefit Support Our Troops).  
 46. §§ 55-4-201 to -202, -209.  
 47. § 55-4-209.  
 48. § 55-4-201(a)(1) (“No plate, other than those issued under part 1 of this chapter [dealing with 
standard license plates], shall be issued or renewed unless authorized in this part [dealing with 
“special” license plates].”).  
 49. For example, the “Children First!” plate raises money for the Department of Human Services, 
which is “to be used solely” for child abuse prevention programs. § 55-4-273.  
 50. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-4-306(b), 55-4-313(b), 55-4-271(c) (2006). 
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must approve the final design.51 An earmarked plate created by statute will 
not be manufactured unless five hundred orders are received within one 
year after the statute’s effective date.52 The “Choose Life” enabling statute 
was enacted in 2003,53 and the plate became available in 2006.54 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP OF THE “CHOOSE LIFE” PLATE 
LITIGATION 
A. Public Forum Doctrine and Viewpoint Discrimination 
An allegation of viewpoint discrimination forms the core of a “Choose 
Life” dispute. Thus, it is important to understand the constitutional basis of 
this claim. The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the right to 
speak free of governmental abridgement.55 While a few jurists have held 
that the Free Speech Clause prohibits any restriction of speech,56 current 
free speech jurisprudence balances individual freedom of speech against 
legitimate governmental interests in limitation.57 Public forum doctrine is 
one such balancing principle, governing speech which occurs on 
government-owned property.58 Courts weigh the government’s proprietary 
interest in reserving its property for its own uses against the individual’s 
interest in unrestricted use of the property for expressive purposes.59 
 
 
 51. § 55-4-201(b)(4).  
 52. §§ 55-4-201(b)(3)(B), 55-4-201(e).  
 53. § 55-4-306.  
 54. Illinois Choose Life, Links to Other Web Sites, http://www.ilchoose-life.org/links.htm (last 
visited July 29, 2007). The litigation embroiling the Tennessee “Choose Life” plate was resolved when 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the plate in March 2006, see ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 
2006), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, see ACLU v. Bredesen, 126 S. Ct. 2972 (2006).  
 55. See supra note 15.  
 56. In Justice Hugo Black’s view, “the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall 
be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of 
Rights did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done in this field.” Konisberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 
U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 57. Two main balancing principles organize free speech jurisprudence: the “categorization 
principle” and the “content distinction principle.” KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 70 (2004). The categorization principle 
excludes certain types of expression from First Amendment protection. Id. Unprotected categories of 
speech include fighting words, see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and obscenity, see Miller 
v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The content distinction principle is discussed infra note 68.  
 58. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). See generally 
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
 59. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. The balancing principle of public forum doctrine was first 
articulated in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). WERHAN, supra 
note 57, at 130–31. The Supreme Court held that a city acted unconstitutionally in refusing to allow a 
group to disseminate information regarding the National Labor Relations Act. The reason:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/4
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Public forum doctrine categorizes certain government-owned properties as 
speech fora, either public or nonpublic.60 On public forum properties, the 
individual has a stronger interest in self-expression, rendering 
governmental restrictions subject to strict judicial scrutiny.61  
Two types of public forum property exist. “Traditional” public fora are 
properties which individuals have historically used for speech,62 such as 
streets, parks, and sidewalks.63 “Designated” public fora are properties 
which have not been historically used for expressive activities but which 
the government has intentionally opened to the public64 or a subset of the 
public for speech.65 Designated public fora need not be real property; even 
government subsidies may fall into this category.66 A nonpublic speech 
forum is created when the government “reserve[s] eligibility for access to 
the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as 
individuals, obtain permission to use it.”67  
 
 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets 
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest 
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general 
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in 
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. 
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16.  
 The Hague decision symbolized the Court’s increasing recognition of free speech as a 
fundamental right. WERHAN, supra note 57, at 130–31. Prior decisions had treated the government’s 
rights as property owner as absolute. Id. (citing Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)).  
 60. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).  
 61. See id. at 678.  
 62. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. “A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups . . . or for 
the discussion of certain subjects.” Id. at 46 n.7. For example, a state university may open its meeting 
rooms to student organizations, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), or a school district may 
allow community groups to use its facilities, see Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). This type of forum has been termed a “limited public forum,” a subset of 
the designated public forum. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). Some 
scholars and courts argue, however, that a limited public forum is actually a subset of the nonpublic 
forum because the government is not subject to strict scrutiny when it sets content-based requirements 
which limit the forum to particular groups or subjects. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public 
Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 77–78 (2004) (summarizing the debate).  
 66. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (characterizing the availability of printing subsidies for 
university student publications as a “metaphysical” limited public forum and holding that “the same 
principles are applicable” for a metaphysical as a “spatial” or “geographic” forum).  
 67. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678–79 (1998) (holding that a 
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The government’s power to limit speech in a public forum is 
constrained. The government may not restrict expression based on the 
subject matter—“content-based discrimination”—or viewpoint of a 
speaker’s message unless the restrictions meet the familiar requirements of 
strict scrutiny: necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.68 Viewpoint discrimination, an “egregious” 
form of content-based discrimination,69 occurs when the government 
limits a speaker because of his or her viewpoint on a subject but allows 
others with a favored viewpoint on that same subject to speak.70 
Viewpoint discrimination can also occur in the absence of an explicit 
viewpoint-based action, where a government entity is vested with 
“unbridled discretion” over access to a public forum.71 This allows 
government officials to make hidden viewpoint-based access decisions.72 
In properties which are not public fora, the government has greater 
leeway to limit individual speech. Content-based distinctions in nonpublic 
fora are constitutionally acceptable if “reasonable in light of the purpose of 
 
 
televised candidate debate was a nonpublic forum because a government agency reserved the debate 
for candidate participation only and made “candidate-by-candidate” assessments of public support in 
deciding which candidates would be included).  
 68. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). The prohibition on 
content-based discrimination in speech fora illustrates the second organizing principle of free speech 
jurisprudence: the content distinction principle. WERHAN, supra note 57, at 70. It subjects government 
restrictions of protected speech to a higher level of judicial scrutiny when they target the content of 
speech rather than its other aspects, such as time, place, or manner. Id. at 72. “The content distinction 
principle registers the Court’s judgment that ‘government censorship’ is the central evil against which 
the First Amendment is directed . . . .” Id. (citing Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
 69. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
 70. Viewpoint discrimination is well illustrated by the facts of Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). A school district implemented a policy permitting the use 
of its facilities during off-school hours for “social, civic, and recreational uses.” Id. at 387. It 
stipulated, however, that no use could be for “religious purposes.” Id. Lamb’s Chapel, a church, sought 
to show a film series in the school building during off-school hours. Id. at 387–389. The series 
discussed childrearing “from a Christian perspective.” Id. at 389. Citing its policy, the school district 
denied the church’s request. Id. The Court held that the school district unconstitutionally discriminated 
against the religious viewpoint of Lamb’s Chapel. Id. at 394. The Court reasoned that the school 
district’s policy and practice had opened its facilities as a speech forum in which childrearing was an 
acceptable topic of discussion. Id. at 392–94. Lamb’s Chapel was denied access to the forum simply 
because it would have approached the topic from a “religious perspective.” Id. at 394.  
 71. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md. v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 457 F.3d 376, 386–
87 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 72. Child Evangelism Fellowship is illustrative. The court held that a school district policy 
vesting school officials with complete discretion to control which organizations could distribute flyers 
for take home to parents was viewpoint discriminatory under the unbridled discretion theory. Id. at 
388–89. It explained: “[V]iewpoint neutrality requires not just that a government refrain from explicit 
viewpoint discrimination, but also that it provide adequate safeguards to protect against the improper 
exclusion of viewpoints.” Id. at 384.  
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the property” and viewpoint-neutral.73 Sometimes, however, courts have 
allowed the government to make viewpoint-based distinctions without 
satisfying strict scrutiny. Such cases have not been decided under the 
public forum framework; instead, government speech doctrine has 
provided the justification.74  
Whether a particular piece of government property constitutes a public 
forum is an important question because it demarcates the scrutiny which 
will apply to governmental speech restrictions. Courts have declined to 
expand the category of traditional public forum beyond streets, parks, and 
sidewalks;75 thus, regarding other types of property, the key inquiry is into 
governmental creation of a forum by designation. The Supreme Court, in 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,76 set forth an 
analysis to guide this inquiry, focusing on the government’s intent with 
respect to the property. The Court explained that the government cannot 
“create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but 
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse.”77 As illustrated by the facts, holding, and rationale of 
Cornelius,78 the analysis proceeds in two steps.  
First, the court should identify the alleged forum by “focus[ing] on the 
access sought by the speaker.”79 Second, the court should utilize three 
factors to analyze the government’s intent with respect to the property80: 
 
 
 73. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
 74. Legal Servs. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“We have said that viewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government itself is the speaker . . . .”); 
Child Evangelism Fellowship, 457 F.3d at 381 n.2 (“Of course, when the government alone speaks, it 
need not remain neutral as to its viewpoint.”). See infra Part II.B for a fuller discussion of government 
speech.  
 75. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). See also Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding that airport terminals are not 
traditional public fora because they “have only recently achieved their contemporary size and 
character”).  
 76. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).  
 77. Id. at 802.  
 78. The Cornelius plaintiffs argued that the exclusion of legal organizations fighting for civil 
rights from a charitable solicitation campaign in the federal workplace amounted to content-based 
discrimination in a public forum. Id. at 790–95. The Court identified the campaign as the alleged 
forum because it was the access point sought by the plaintiffs. Id. at 805–06. The federal government 
had organized the campaign in order to minimize workplace disruption from solicitation, which 
indicated a policy not to open the campaign to the public at large and suggested that federal offices 
were not compatible with expressive activities. Id. at 804–09. Further, in practice, the government had 
consistently required would-be participants to apply and had accepted only organizations providing 
social services to the needy. Id. at 806. Thus, the Court concluded that the government had not 
designated the campaign as a public forum. Id. Rather, because the government had a consistent policy 
and practice of selective access based on admission criteria, it had created a nonpublic forum. Id.  
 79. Id. at 801. 
 80. Id. at 803–04.  
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the government’s policy regarding the property, its practice with respect to 
the property, and the compatibility of the property’s objective nature with 
expressive activity.81  
In sum, public forum jurisprudence balances the government’s First 
Amendment obligations toward individuals with the government’s own 
interests. If a forum for speech exists, whether traditionally or by the 
government’s designation, neutrality toward all viewpoints espoused in the 
forum is the government’s constitutional obligation. However, government 
speech doctrine, another constitutional framework relating to the use of 
state-owned property for expressive activity, has developed further in 
recent years, coming into tension with public forum doctrine.82  
B. Government Speech  
Through unique life experiences, individuals develop viewpoints on the 
best ways to improve society and persuade others of their ideas through 
speech. Because they represent the citizenry collectively at the federal, 
state, and local levels, government entities also have a perspective on what 
it means to better the community.83 In the American republic, citizens send 
candidates to government positions in order to enact the societal views 
with which they agree.84 In order to structure societal change, officials not 
only make law but also directly communicate with the public.85 For 
instance, they may employ persuasive speech as a way to encourage 
 
 
 81. Id. at 802–03.  
 82. See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001). This article analyzes the intersection between government speech and 
public forum doctrine in eight emerging areas of government speech. The authors observe that “[t]his 
bipolar universe is, of course, an artifice, for government speech is necessarily accomplished through 
the speech of individuals . . . . By insisting on the artifice, however, the Court has become theoretically 
and analytically stuck . . . at the edge of a chasm between government speech and the public forum.” 
Id. at 1381.  
 83. See id. at 1380. “In the modern state,” government fulfills many societal roles: “a creator of 
rights and programs, a manager of economic and social relationships, a vast employer and purchaser, 
an educator, investor, curator, librarian, historian, patron, and on and on.” Id. Acting in these 
capacities, the “[g]overnment must explain, persuade, coerce, deplore, congratulate, implore, teach, 
inspire, and defend with words.” Id.  
 84. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at 
least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the 
government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”). 
 85. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency designs informational programs to 
communicate with the public regarding environmental and health concerns, see EPA Newsroom, 
Public Service Announcements, http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/psa.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) 
(describing educational campaigns which are disseminated through broadcast and print media).  
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desirable social behavior, even regarding controversial matters.86 At times, 
individuals may feel that the government’s speech has unconstitutionally 
drowned out their own voices.87 Recently, some courts have upheld 
viewpoint-based exclusions from government property on the theory that 
the exclusion served a government speech interest.88  
The government must speak in order to function.89 However, the 
government’s ability to select one viewpoint from among many to 
promote as its own could allow the government to diminish robust social 
dialogue, to mask its own advocacy, or to coerce private speakers into 
parroting the state-sanctioned line.90 The Supreme Court has reasoned that 
political accountability is the principal way to balance the need for 
government speech against its inherent dangers: 
The latitude which may exist for restrictions on speech where the 
government’s own message is being delivered flows in part from 
our observation that, ‘when the government speaks, for instance to 
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the 
 
 
 86. For example, the government has employed doctors for the purpose of encouraging women 
to choose childbirth over abortion. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 93–113. 
 87. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (involving 
political candidate excluded from a candidate debate broadcast on public television); Legal Servs. 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (involving prohibition on recipients of funds under the 
Legal Services Corporation Act from seeking change in the welfare laws through litigation).  
 88. See, e.g., ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 37 (6th. Cir. 2006) (allowing state to offer “Choose 
Life” license plate without a counterpart pro-choice plate as an exercise of government speech); Wells 
v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a local government’s 
holiday display, which included Christian and secular symbols, as well as a sign acknowledging the 
display’s corporate sponsors, was government speech and allowing the government to exclude the 
plaintiff’s anti-religious sign); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 
1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a university radio station’s on-air acknowledgement of its sponsors 
was government speech and allowing the station to reject an offer of sponsorship from the Ku Klux 
Klan).  
 For a thorough discussion of the many ways modern governments speak, see Bezanson & Buss, 
supra note 82. The authors explore several paradigms of government speech and how these have been 
treated by courts: implementation of government policy as speech, government as educator, allocation 
of fees in higher education, government as editor, government as patron of the arts, and government’s 
right not to speak. On government speech generally, see MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech 
on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE 
L.J. 151 (1996); Steven Shriffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).  
 89. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, 
government has to say something . . . .”).  
 90. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1488–94, 1509–11, for a thoughtful analysis of the 
dangers of monopolization, deception, and coercion. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000), for the argument that government speech is essentially a good thing for 
society as long as these dangers are avoided.  
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end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could 
espouse some different or contrary position.’91  
The government speech doctrine is relatively new to First Amendment 
jurisprudence,92 originating in a controversial decision regarding 
government funding for family planning services. Although the decision 
did not contain the words “government speech,” Rust v. Sullivan93 has 
been recognized subsequently as the “fountainhead” of that doctrine.94 In 
Rust, the Supreme Court upheld regulations designed to prevent federal 
grant money from flowing to health clinics which performed or promoted 
abortion services.95 The Department of Health and Human Services 
promulgated the regulations under Title X of the Public Health Service 
Act, which authorized grants for contraceptive family planning.96 Title X 
grantees, typically private health clinics,97 were prohibited from using the 
funds to promote abortion either through medical counsel or general 
advocacy.98 Certain Title X clinics and their employee doctors challenged 
the regulations under the First Amendment as viewpoint discriminatory.99 
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the regulations, holding that 
they were a proper exercise of the government’s right to “make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds.”100  
 
 
 91. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541–42 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).  
 92. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (“The government-speech 
doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”) (Souter, J., dissenting); Post, supra note 
88, at 151 (explaining that the perception of the First Amendment as a protection against government 
restriction of speech means that “traditional First Amendment doctrine has had rather little to say about 
the speech of the government itself”).  
 93. 500 U.S. 173 (1990).  
 94. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech 
Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2411 (2004). See also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale . . . [of] 
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust 
on this understanding.”). But see Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the private 
doctors’ confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is hard 
to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.”).  
 95. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179–181, 203. 
 96. Id. at 178–79. Section 1008 of Title X provided that “none of the funds appropriated under 
this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” Id. at 178 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)).  
 97. Id. at 196.  
 98. Id. at 179–80.  
 99. Id. at 181.  
 100. Id. at 192–93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).  
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The subsequent recognition of Rust as a government speech case 
hinges on two governmental prerogatives that the Court relied on in its 
rationale.101 First, the government has the right to set and fund policy 
preferences.102 Second, the government has a legitimate need to ensure 
that funds dedicated to a preferred policy effectively advance that 
policy.103 Regarding the Rust regulations, Congress had decided that 
contraception was a better means of family planning than abortion and had 
created a program to implement that policy judgment.104 The Title X 
regulations were “designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program 
[were] observed.”105  
The Rust Court legitimized the exercise of these two prerogatives, even 
though this amounted to a viewpoint-based limitation on the doctors’ 
speech.106 Essentially, the Court treated the doctors as agents of the federal 
government, private speakers conveying a governmental message.107 
Because the doctors voluntarily accepted Title X funds and the restriction 
did not extend to abortion-related speech outside the Title X-funded 
programs,108 their freedom of expression as “employees” was 
 
 
 101. When the Velazquez Court identified Rust as an implicit government speech case, see supra 
note 94, it explicitly delineated these two prerogatives. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533, 541 (2001). The Court described Rust as an instance in which the government implemented “its 
own program” through private speakers. Id. It affirmed that when so using private speakers, the 
government “may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled 
nor distorted.” Id.  
 102. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. Earlier cases established the legitimacy of a government policy 
preference for childbirth, even though abortion is a fundamental right. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 (1980) (upholding restrictions on public funding for abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 
(1977) (holding that the government may subsidize childbirth without subsidizing abortion).  
 103. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–94.  
 104. Id. at 178–79.  
 105. Id. at 193.  
 106. The Court did not explicitly acknowledge the discriminatory effect of the Title X regulations. 
It stated that the government’s choice “to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other” did not mean 
it had “discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.” Id. Clearly, however, the government objected to the 
pro-abortion viewpoint of the doctors. Presumably, this did not amount to “discrimination” in the mind 
of the Court because of its prior conclusion regarding the legitimacy of selective subsidization of 
preferred policy.  
 107. See id. at 198–99. The Court does not use the term “agents,” but commentators have 
explained the court’s rationale on an agency theory. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1391–93 
(explaining two competing views of Rust, in one of which the “agency factor” is “critical”); Jacobs, 
supra note 30, at 450–52 (characterizing Rust as a government-agent case).  
 108. That the speech restriction was tied to the use of Title X funds was a key fact. It allowed the 
Court to distinguish its “unconstitutional conditions” cases, in which the question of whether the 
government can restrict speech when it doles out benefits depends on whether the restrictions apply to 
activities of recipients which do not utilize the benefits. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197–98. Compare FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating a statute which prohibited 
editorializing by noncommercial, educational TV, and radio stations which received federal funding) 
and Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding statute 
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appropriately limited.109 The Court also noted that the doctors were free to 
inform patients that abortion advice was simply outside the scope of the 
clinic’s services.110  
The tension between the government’s control over its agents’ speech 
and the government’s obligation to be viewpoint-neutral toward speakers 
in a public forum was not lost on the Rust Court. It noted that the ability to 
be viewpoint-selective would not apply where the government “subsidy” 
at issue was physical property constituting either a traditional or 
designated public forum.111 Speakers availing themselves of such property 
would not thereby become government agents, subject to viewpoint 
discriminatory restrictions.112  
As one scholar posits, the Rust Court “essentially confessed to the 
irrelevance of the criterion of viewpoint discrimination” in certain 
contexts.113 The unshakable question after Rust: When is the government 
free to promote its viewpoint while displacing the opposite views of 
individuals, such as the doctors in Rust? Rust could be read as limiting that 
ability to instances when the government hires private speakers to 
promulgate a constitutionally legitimate, discrete message, such as 
“Childbirth is preferable to abortion.” In the government speech cases 
following Rust, the Supreme Court attempted to map out, more by 
example than principle,114 the boundaries of government speech as a 
defense to claims of impermissible viewpoint discrimination.  
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia115 
allowed the Court to explore the distinction between the government 
subsidizing private agent-speakers and the government offering monetary 
resources as a forum for speech. Students at the University of Virginia (the 
University) alleged viewpoint discrimination when the school denied 
printing subsidies for their Christian newspaper.116 University policy 
 
 
prohibiting nonprofit organizations from using tax-deductible contributions for lobbying because such 
organizations could lobby with non-deductible contributions). 
 This reasoning of the Rust Court is controversial. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1382 
(explaining a view of Rust which sees “little or no significance” in the fact that the restricted speech 
was government-funded); Post, supra note 88, at 169 (arguing that Rust’s distinction between 
restrictions on funded and unfunded speech is “not constitutionally determinative”).  
 109. Rust, 500 U.S. at 198–99. 
 110. Id. at 200.  
 111. Id. at 199–200.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Post, supra note 88, at 170.  
 114. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1509 (noting the “patchwork quilt quality of the 
government speech cases”).  
 115. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
 116. Id. at 822–27.  
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provided that student groups could receive funding for activities related to 
“student news, information, opinion, [and] entertainment” (the activity 
funding policy).117 Explicitly excluded were the “religious activities” of 
student groups.118 The newspaper, which covered topics such as “racism, 
crisis pregnancy, [and] stress,” was denied printing subsidies under this 
exception.119  
The Court held that the University discriminated against the 
newspaper’s religious viewpoint.120 The Court rejected an argument that 
the newspaper was the University’s speech,121 reasoning instead that the 
activity funding policy created a “metaphysical” public forum.122 
Contrasting the facts of Rosenberger with Rust, the Court found that the 
University did not attempt to enlist the student groups as bearers of its own 
message.123 First, the purpose of the activity funding policy was to 
“encourage a diversity of views,” rather than to convey a discrete 
message.124 Second, the University affirmatively distanced itself from the 
views of the funded groups, declaring in a signed agreement that they were 
not its agents or subject to its control.125  
Rosenberger has been referred to as the “standard bearer for one of two 
poles in the Court’s government speech jurisprudence,” the opposite pole 
being borne by Rust.126 Rosenberger teaches that speech subsidization 
does not amount to government speech when two conditions are present: 
intent to encourage the expression of diverse views coupled with the 
absence of a discrete governmental message and explicit disavowal of the 
funded speakers. Because, in Rosenberger, the University was clearly not 
trying to communicate its own message through the student groups, the 
Court was not compelled draw out the full implications of Rust’s holding 
that selective viewpoint subsidization is sometimes justified as 
government speech.127  
 
 
 117. Id. at 824. 
 118. Id. at 825.  
 119. Id. at 826–27.  
 120. Id. at 837. The Court further held that the viewpoint-based denial of funding was not justified 
by the University’s interest in avoiding the establishment of religion. Id. at 846–46. 
 121. Id. at 834–35.  
 122. Id. at 830.  
 123. Id. at 833.  
 124. Id. at 834.  
 125. Id. at 834–35. 
 126. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1407.  
 127. See id. at 1407–08 (“What more is needed to convert forum management actions into 
expressive actions is a critical question, one the Court did not address at all . . . .”).  
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Two cases with facts falling between the Rust and Rosenberger poles 
forced the Court to consider whether the government could claim 
relatively indiscrete messages as its own speech. In Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes,128 a political candidate unsuccessfully 
argued that his exclusion from a debate broadcast on public television 
amounted to discrimination based on his political ideology.129 The Court 
disposed of the case in favor of the public broadcaster on the ground that 
the candidate’s exclusion was viewpoint-neutral130 and exploited the 
opportunity to explore the nature of government speech.131  
In the Court’s view, public broadcasting should be classified as 
government “speech activity” rather than as a forum for speech.132 It is the 
role of public broadcasters to exercise “editorial discretion,” selecting 
from among “speakers expressing different viewpoints” in order to create 
programming in the public interest.133 Although this discretion can be 
abused, broadcaster liability for viewpoint discrimination would 
essentially transfer control over program content from entities accountable 
to the public to would-be plaintiffs.134 Additionally, in the candidate 
debate context, a rule that every candidate be included, regardless of 
popularity, could result in logistical complexity and reduce the educational 
value of programming, leading the broadcaster to forgo debates 
altogether.135 
The Court recognized candidate debates, however, as “the narrow 
exception” to its rule that editorial discretion is government speech.136 In a 
candidate debate, the broadcaster “implicit[ly]” represents that the “views 
expressed [are] those of the candidates, not his own.”137  
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,138 the Supreme Court 
considered whether Congress constitutionally could require the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to consider “artistic excellence and artistic 
 
 
 128. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).  
 129. Id. at 669. Ralph Forbes was an independent candidate for a seat in the House of 
Representatives. Id. at 670. Motivated by the limited time for debate, the Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission invited only the Republican and Democratic candidates to participate. Id. 
 130. The Court held that Forbes’s exclusion was based on his lack of public support. Id. at 682–
83.  
 131. Id. at 672–76.  
 132. Id. at 674.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 674–75.  
 135. Id. at 681. 
 136. Id. at 675. The Court further concluded that the candidate debate represented a nonpublic 
forum. Id. at 677–80.  
 137. Id. at 675. 
 138. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  
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merit” and “general standards of decency” as criteria for grants.139 Artists 
denied funding argued that the statute required unconstitutional 
discrimination based on the controversial content of their work.140 The 
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the statute.141  
The phrase “government speech” does not appear in the Court’s 
rationale; however, the Court implicitly relied on that doctrine by 
contrasting the Finley facts with Rosenberger’s.142 The Court reasoned 
that the University in Rosenberger had “indiscriminately encourage[d]” 
student groups to apply for funding, thus creating a speech forum.143 By 
contrast, the NEA’s standard of excellence implied up-front that artistic 
merit would be a discriminating criterion.144 Content-based considerations 
inevitably play a role in measuring excellence.145 Selective subsidization 
of artwork was further justified by the fact that Congress clearly 
articulated its purpose for the new criteria in the NEA statute: to enhance 
“‘public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer funds.’”146 
In the Court’s most recent government speech case, it faced a different 
issue: the government speech doctrine was not invoked to shield alleged 
viewpoint discriminatory acts. Instead, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Association147 concerned the constitutionality of compelled subsidies for 
generic beef advertising.148 Congress authorized an advertising campaign 
to encourage American consumption of beef and provided general content 
guidelines for the ads, which were to be designed by the Agriculture 
Department.149 The campaign was subsidized by a mandatory assessment 
on beef producers, and many ads bore the tagline “Funded by America’s 
Beef Producers.”150 Members of the advertising design committee were 
either appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture or elected by industry 
 
 
 139. Id. at 572. These criteria were added to the basic standard of “artistic and cultural 
significance” after controversial works were funded. Id. at 573–76 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).  
 140. Id. at 577–78.  
 141. Id. at 584.  
 142. Id. at 586, 588. Commentators also recognize Finley as a government speech decision. See 
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1452–67; Dolan, supra note 65, at 102–04; Jacobs, supra note 30, 
at 456–60.  
 143. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.  
 144. Id. 585–86.  
 145. Id. at 585 (reasoning that “absolute neutrality is simply inconceivable”).  
 146. Id. at 588 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5)).  
 147. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).  
 148. Id. at 555, 565.  
 149. Id. at 553–54, 561. The purpose of the campaign was to “advance the image and desirability 
of beef,” and general content guidelines included a prohibition on brand names. Id. at 561–62. The 
campaign’s most successful ad ran “Beef. It’s What’s For Dinner.” Id. at 554.  
 150. Id. at 554.  
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councils.151 Agriculture Department officials provided design input and 
reviewed the ads before dissemination.152 Plaintiff beef producers153 
alleged two First Amendment claims based on compulsion: compelled 
subsidy of private speech through the mandatory assessment154 and 
compelled speech by audience attribution of the ads to them.155 The Court 
ruled that the ads were government speech and rejected both claims.156  
In holding that the ad campaign represented government speech, the 
Court reasoned that authority for the “overall message” of the campaign 
and “final approval authority” over all its details lay in the government’s 
hands. The “overall message” of the campaign was set by Congress in 
statute.157 The Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) retained “final 
approval authority” for all details of the published ads.158 The fact that the 
Secretary could reject or rewrite all proposed ads supported the ads’ 
character as government speech, even though private individuals sat on the 
design committee.159 Moreover, Congress could alter the statute at any 
 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 561.  
 153. Beef producers complained because they viewed the generic advertising as harming their 
efforts to distinguish superior grades of beef. Id. at 556. 
 154. Id. at 556. It is a violation of the First Amendment for the government to compel citizens to 
fund private speech which is not “germane” to the government purpose in exacting the fee. See, e.g., 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that a school board could not require 
teachers to finance the political activities of their union); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 
(1990) (holding that lawyers’ mandatory dues could not be expended for purposes not “necessarily or 
reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession”). See Note, supra note 94, at  
2418–22 for a fuller discussion of compelled-subsidy doctrine.  
 155. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564. Compelled speech is a violation of the First Amendment right not 
to speak. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977), are cases commonly cited for this proposition. In Barnette, the Court ruled that a public school 
could not require objecting children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. 319 U.S. at 642. See infra text 
accompanying notes 173–76 for a brief discussion of Wooley.  Although the Johanns plaintiffs were 
not forced to speak literally, Justice Thomas noted that “associating individuals or organizations 
involuntarily with speech by attributing an unwanted message to them” also violates this right. 
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 156. The Court distinguished its prior compelled-subsidy cases, such as Abood, on the ground that 
the speech there was presumed to be non-governmental. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559. However, citizens 
“have no right not to fund government speech.” Id. at 562.  
 The Court rejected the compelled-speech argument because the plaintiffs’ challenge was facial, 
rather than as-applied, and the statute did not require the allegedly attributive tagline. Id. at 565. 
However, the Court left open the possibility than an as-applied challenge, based on facts indicating 
that the audiences actually attributed the ads to the plaintiffs, might succeed. Id. at 565–66.  
 157. Id. at 561–62.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 561.  
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time.160 The Court reasoned that such “political safeguards [were] more 
than adequate to set [the ads] apart from private messages.”161  
Appellate courts faced with government speech defenses to viewpoint 
discrimination claims have attempted to synthesize and apply the Supreme 
Court’s government speech cases. The circuit courts have considered 
government speech in cases involving, inter alia, a bulletin board at a 
public school,162 a holiday display outside a city building,163 on-air 
sponsor acknowledgement by a public radio station,164 a specialty license 
plate displaying the Confederate flag,165 and issuance of “Choose Life” 
license plates.166 Generally, these courts have employed two steps in 
analyzing whether government speech is a constitutionally permissible 
justification for viewpoint discrimination. First, courts consider the nature 
of the particular speech being challenged, evaluating whether it is 
governmental, private, or “mixed.”167 As a balancing framework by which 
to analyze this question, courts often utilize a four-factor test (the four-
factor test), which examines the purpose of the speech, the state’s degree 
of editorial control over the speech, the identity of the literal speaker, and 
whether the government or citizen bears ultimate responsibility for the 
 
 
 160. Id. at 563–64.  
 161. Id. at 563.  
 162. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
school bulletin board postings promoting gay and lesbian awareness were government speech and 
allowing the school to prohibit the plaintiff-teacher from posting his own anti-homosexuality 
materials).  
 163. Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1144 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
local government’s holiday display, which included Christian and secular symbols, as well as a sign 
acknowledging the display’s corporate sponsors, was government speech and allowing the government 
to exclude the plaintiff’s anti-religious sign).  
 164. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1096 (8th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a university radio station’s on-air acknowledgement of its sponsors was 
government speech and allowing the station to reject an offer of sponsorship from the Ku Klux Klan).  
 165. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 
(4th Cir. 2002). In Virginia’s specialty plate scheme, nonprofit organizations could contact a member 
of the state legislature and request a specialty plate for the organization’s members. Id. at 614. If 
statutorily approved, the Department of Motor Vehicles would coordinate design of the plate; 
normally, it was acceptable for an organization to display its logo on the plate. Id. The Sons of 
Confederate Veterans (SCV) received legislative approval for a specialty plate. Id. at 613. However, 
the enabling statute disallowed the display of any logo. Id. at 614. The SCV’s logo contained a 
Confederate flag. Id. at 613. The Fourth Circuit held that the plate represented private speech and that 
Virginia had impermissibly discriminated against the SCV’s expression of pride in the “Southern 
heritage and ideals of independence.” Id. at 621, 624.  
 166. Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 
F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). See infra Part III for discussion of these cases.  
 167. See, e.g., Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (deciding “Choose Life” specialty license plate represented 
“mixed speech”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 228 F.3d at 621 (deciding that specialty license plate 
for the SCV represented private speech).  
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speech.168 Second, given the governmental or private nature of the speech 
itself and the context in which it occurs, courts consider whether 
viewpoint neutrality toward the message it conveys is required.169 
Specifically, they consider whether the state has created a forum for 
speech170 or whether the state should be able to restrict other speakers in 
order to further its own speech.171  
III. “CHOOSE LIFE” PLATES IN THE COURTS 
The Supreme Court has four times declined to weigh in on the “Choose 
Life” controversy.172 In its sole case considering license plate speech, 
Wooley v. Maynard,173 the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a 
state to require drivers to display the motto “Live Free or Die” on their 
standard license plates.174 To do so would compel objecting drivers to 
speak the state’s message175 because the license plates were “readily 
associated with” the drivers.176  
Lower courts that have reached the merits in “Choose Life” plate cases 
have grappled with the questions of whose speech is represented by the 
message “Choose Life” and whether a state should be bound to viewpoint 
neutrality or free to further its own viewpoint within its specialty license 
plate scheme.177 In these cases, an individual or organization claims that 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 228 F.3d at 619; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141–42; Ku 
Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093–94. But see Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380 (declining to apply the four-factor 
test and instead applying the Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Johanns to determine whether a 
state’s “Choose Life” plate was government or private speech).  
 169. See, e.g., Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (deciding 
that school bulletin board postings were government speech and then considering whether the school 
could prevent messages contrary to its own from being posted); Wells v. City and County of Denver, 
257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (deciding that local government’s holiday display was 
government speech and then considering whether government could prevent an organization from 
including its own sign in the display); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 228 F.3d at 616, 622 (deciding 
that a requested specialty plate which would bear the Confederate Flag logo was private speech and 
then considering whether the state could refuse to issue it on the basis of viewpoint); Rose, 361 F.3d at 
794–95 (deciding “Choose Life” specialty license plate was “mixed speech” and then considering 
whether the state could offer the “Choose Life” plate without a counterpart pro-choice plate).  
 170. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 228 F.3d at 622–23; Rose, 361 F.3d at 798.  
 171. See Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1143.  
 172. See ACLU v. Bredesen, 126 S. Ct. 2972 (2006); Keeler v. Stalder, 126 S. Ct. 2967 (2005); 
Rose v. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 543 U.S. 1119 (2005); Henderson v. Stalder, 537 U.S. 1048 
(2002). 
 173. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
 174. Id. at 707, 717. The plaintiff, a Jehovah’s Witness, objected because he believed life to be 
“more precious than freedom.” Id. at 708 n.2.  
 175. See supra note 154 for a discussion of compelled speech.  
 176. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.15.  
 177. ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 
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the state had opened its specialty license plates as a forum for speech, 
thereby requiring the state to be neutral toward whatever views drivers 
wish to express on a plate. The state counters that its action of either 
offering a solo “Choose Life” plate or of refusing to offer a “Choose Life” 
plate is constitutionally permissible as its own speech. Perhaps due to the 
lack of a full-bodied judicial conception of government speech and the 
intuitive notion that the speech of both state and citizen is implicated in a 
specialty license plate, courts have disagreed on the constitutionality of the 
“Choose Life” plate.  
In Planned Parenthood v. Rose,178 the Fourth Circuit held that South 
Carolina had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by creating a “Choose 
Life” plate without a pro-choice counterpart.179 Although South Carolina 
had an administrative application process for the creation of certain types 
of specialty plates,180 the “Choose Life” plate was created by statute.181 
 
 
F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 19, 2007); Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005). 
 178. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 179. Id. at 788–89. Judge Michael wrote the lengthiest opinion and announced the judgment of the 
court. His two colleagues, Judge Luttig and Judge Gregory, each wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. Id. at 800–01 (Gregory & Luttig, JJ., concurring); In his concurrence, Judge Gregory 
explained that he continued to disagree with the result in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002), in which 
the Fourth Circuit applied the four-factor test concluding, that a requested specialty plate bearing a 
Confederate flag logo was private speech, and held that Virginia could not refuse to issue the plate. Id. 
at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring). Judge Gregory dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in Sons 
of Confederate Veterans because he concluded that the four-factor test did not adequately consider the 
state’s interest in not displaying a racially hostile symbol on its license plates. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying 
reh’g en banc) (Gregory, J., dissenting). However, he concurred in Rose because “the judgment 
reached [in Rose] applies the factors set forth in Sons of Confederate Veterans in a manner that begins 
to recognize the government speech interests that are implicated in the vanity license plate forum.” 
Rose, 361 F.3d at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring). Because Judge Gregory appears to have concurred in 
order to express continuing disagreement with Sons of Confederate Veterans and indicates some 
support for Judge Michael’s reasoning, I will refer to Judge Michael’s opinion as the opinion of the 
“Rose court” throughout the text.  
 Concurring in Rose, Judge Luttig relied on the reasoning in his opinion respecting denial of 
rehearing en banc in Sons of Confederate Veterans. Id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring). In that opinion, 
he expressed the view that his colleagues were caught in a false dichotomy, believing that speech had 
to be either private or governmental. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of 
Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2002) (reh’g denied en banc) (Luttig, J., writing 
separate opinion respecting denial of reh’g en banc). Judge Luttig thought that “speech that appears on 
the so-called ‘special’ or ‘vanity’ license plate could prove to be the quintessential example of speech 
that is both private and governmental.” Id. at 245. He also opined that where the private speech interest 
was “significant” and the governmental interest was “less than compelling,” the government would be 
forbidden from viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 247.  
 180. A South Carolina statute allowed nonprofit organizations to apply to an administrative 
department for a plate which would bear the group’s identifying logo or seal and be sold only to the 
group’s members. Rose, 361 F.3d at 788 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000).  
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Acting on their own initiative, two legislators introduced a bill creating the 
plate and, despite initial failure, successfully persuaded fellow lawmakers 
to enact a “Choose Life” provision as an addition to another specialty plate 
bill.182 Revenues from the “Choose Life” plate were designated for a 
special fund “to be used to support local crisis pregnancy programs.”183 
Organization which provided, promoted, or referred women for abortion 
services were ineligible to receive grants from this fund.184  
The Rose court employed the four-factor test to analyze whether the 
speech on the “Choose Life” plate was “government” or “private.”185 The 
first two factors, the purpose of the “Choose Life” plate and the state’s 
degree of editorial control over it, pointed to government speech.186 The 
plate was created at the initiative of state legislators, rather than a pro-life 
organization, and revenues flowed only to crisis pregnancy centers that did 
not advise women to have an abortion.187 These facts indicated that the 
state intended to express its “preference for the pro-life position.”188 By 
specifying the words “Choose Life” in the enabling statutory provision, 
South Carolina retained “complete editorial control” over the plate’s 
message.189  
Analyzing the third and fourth factors together, the Rose court 
concluded that the individual driver was both the “literal speaker” of the 
“Choose Life” message and bore “ultimate responsibility” for it.190 
Drawing on the idea in Wooley that a standard license plate is “associated 
with” the vehicle driver,191 the court reasoned that a specialty plate is more 
 
 
 181. Id. at 788–89 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910). The legislature had created other plates 
by statute as well, some available only to honorees, such as plates for Purple Heart recipients and 
volunteer firemen, and some available to any driver, such as “Keep South Carolina Beautiful.” Id. at 
788 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-3310, 56-3-2810, 56-3-3950).  
 With both the administrative and legislative branches able to originate specialty plates, South 
Carolina followed a hybrid model of specialty plate creation. See infra Part V.C for an illustration of a 
hybrid model. Because of the outcome in Rose, South Carolina has modified its specialty plate creation 
process to be purely administrative. See Choose Life Newsletter, supra note 6.  
 182. Rose, 361 F.3d at 788–89. The initial bill creating the “Choose Life” plate died in committee 
in the South Carolina House of Representatives after a representative from Planned Parenthood South 
Carolina testified that a pro-choice specialty plate should be offered as well. Id. at 788. The “Choose 
Life” plate was eventually added to a bill creating a “NASCAR” specialty plate. Id at 789.  
 183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910(B) (2006).  
 184. Id.  
 185. Rose, 361 F.3d at 793. In particular, Rose relied heavily on Sons of Confederate Veterans. 
See Rose, 361 F.3d at 792–94.  
 186. Id. at 793.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 793–94.  
 191. See supra text accompanying note 176.  
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strongly associated with the driver because it must be selected at 
additional cost.192 With evenly balanced factors, the court concluded that 
the “Choose Life” plate was “mixed” speech.193  
The Rose court further decided that viewpoint discrimination was 
impermissible because the state had opened its specialty license plate 
scheme as a speech forum.194 A review of Supreme Court cases involving 
government speech and viewpoint discrimination led the court to believe 
that the nature of the speech “medium,” not only the identity of the 
speaker, was important.195 The court reasoned that South Carolina did not 
“enlist” drivers to display the “Choose Life” plate as it would enlist 
employees for a project.196 Instead, drivers selected and paid extra for the 
plate in order to express agreement with its message.197 On this ground, 
the court distinguished Rust, in which the government was allowed to 
restrict the speech of doctors it employed.198 Thus, the court concluded 
that “[t]he medium here—the specialty license plate scheme—is more like 
a limited forum for expression than it is like a school, museum, or 
clinic.”199 Having created a speech forum, South Carolina could not 
exclude the pro-choice viewpoint from its specialty plates.200 This result 
was further supported by the court’s perception that the state’s advocacy 
of the “Choose Life” message was not obvious to the public, allowing the 
state to evade political accountability for its pro-life view.201  
Two years after Rose, the Sixth Circuit in ACLU v. Bredesen202 broke 
ranks with the Fourth Circuit and upheld a solo “Choose Life” plate as 
government speech.203 Bredesen involved a challenge to Tennessee’s 
 
 
 192. Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)).  
 193. Id. (“The State speaks by authorizing the Choose Life plate and creating the message, all to 
promote the pro-life point of view; the individual speaks by displaying the Choose Life plate on her 
vehicle.”).  
 194. Id. at 795–99.  
 195. Id. at 795–98. In addition to Rust, the court considered Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a state university engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination when it refused to subsidize printing of a student newspaper for a Christian 
organization) and Legal Services v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that the federal 
government engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it prohibited recipients of funds under the 
Legal Services Corporation Act from seeking change in the welfare laws through litigation).  
 196. Rose, 361 F.3d at 798.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 795.  
 201. Id. at 798–99. 
 202. 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 203. Id.  
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“Choose Life” plate, which had been created by legislative enactment.204 
The enabling statute specified the words “Choose Life” and explicitly 
designated half of the plate’s revenues to New Life Resources, a pro-life 
pregnancy resource center, which would distribute a portion of the funds 
to similar organizations, including adoption organizations, across 
Tennessee.205 The statute also mandated that New Life Resources use the 
funds “exclusively for counseling and financial assistance, including food, 
clothing, and medical assistance for pregnant women in Tennessee.”206 
The plate would be designed “in consultation with” New Life 
Resources,207 but final design would be “determined by the commissioner 
[of safety].”208 In addition, Tennessee retained the right to “withdraw 
authorization” for any license plate.209  
The Sixth Circuit declined to use the four-factor test to analyze whether 
the message “Choose Life” was government or private speech.210 The 
court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johanns, which 
held that agricultural advertising financed by compelled subsidies on 
producers was government speech,211 set forth the “authoritative test” for 
identifying government speech.212 Following the reasoning in Johanns, the 
court ruled that “Choose Life” was a message “crafted” by the state of 
Tennessee.213 Not only did the state “set the overall message” of the plate 
but it also delineated in statute the specific wording “Choose Life.”214 In 
addition, the state retained “final approval authority” over the plate 
because a state official supervised plate design and retained the 
 
 
 204. Id. at 372. See supra text accompanying notes 45–54 for a more detailed description of 
Tennessee’s specialty plate scheme. An amendment to the “Choose Life” enabling statute proposing a 
pro-choice specialty plate was defeated in the legislature. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372.  
 205. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-4-306(a), (c). The statute lists dozens of organizations which 
will receive a portion of the funds, such as Crisis Pregnancy Center of Cookeville, Care Net Pregnancy 
Services, and Hope Clinic. § 55-4-306(d)(6)(B).  
 206. § 55-3-306(c). In addition, New Life Resources was prohibited from using any of the funds 
for “purposes of lobbying, promoting legislation or the election or defeat of any political candidate.” 
§ 55-4-36(d)(5).  
 207. § 55-4-306(b).  
 208. § 55-4-202(b)(2). See § 55-1-111 (defining “commissioner”).  
 209. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376.  
 210. Id. at 380.  
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 147–61 for a discussion of Johanns.  
 212. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380. The Bredesen court felt that “the Fourth Circuit opinions in Rose 
[were] in tension with the intervening case of Johanns. . . . Rose relied instead on a pre-Johanns four-
factor test of the Fourth Circuit’s own devising . . . .” Id. 
 213. Id. at 375.  
 214. Id. at 376.  
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prerogative to cancel the plate.215 Thus, “Choose Life” was “Tennessee’s 
own message.”216 
The Bredesen court further concluded that Tennessee had not opened 
its specialty license plates as a speech forum.217 The ACLU argued that the 
state’s use of “volunteer” drivers to disseminate a message created a 
speech forum.218 Rejecting this contention, the court invoked Rust.219 The 
government did not create a forum in Rust by hiring doctors to disseminate 
its pro-childbirth message.220 In the court’s view, even had the doctors 
offered to serve in the Title X clinic without pay, the government would 
still have been allowed to restrict them from advising abortion.221 Thus, 
the court ruled that volunteer dissemination of a government-crafted 
message, such as “Choose Life,” did not “create” a speech forum.222 
Rather, drivers who choose to display the “Choose Life” plate “pay out of 
their own pockets for the privilege of putting the government-crafted 
message on their private property.”223 Because Tennessee had not created 
a forum, it was not obliged to allow the pro-choice viewpoint onto a 
specialty plate.224  
In the two most recent “Choose Life” district court cases, the 
ideologies of plaintiff and defendant were reversed. Pro-life plaintiffs 
alleged that the states’ refusal to issue “Choose Life” plates was viewpoint 
discriminatory. In Arizona Life Coalition v. Stanton,225 an organization 
whose application for a “Choose Life” plate had been denied by Arizona 
brought suit.226 Arizona Life Coalition (AZLC), a group of over forty pro-
life organizations, had applied for a specialty plate according to the state’s 
 
 
 215. Id. at 375–76.  
 216. Id. at 376.  
 217. Id. at 377–78. 
 218. Id. at 377.  
 219. Id. at 378. See discussion of Rust supra text accompanying notes 93–113.  
 220. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. The Bredesen court was also troubled by the perceived implications of holding that 
volunteer dissemination of a governmental message creates a forum. Id. at 378–79. A large amount of 
“long-accepted,” privately disseminated governmental messages would become unconstitutional 
unless speech from the opposite viewpoint was also allowed access to the relevant forum. Id. at 380. 
For example, government-produced pins advocating “Register and Vote” would be unconstitutional 
unless the government also agreed to produce “Don’t Vote” pins upon request. Id. at 379. The 
“unstated distinction” between “Choose Life” and “Register and Vote”—that “Choose Life” is 
controversial—is “entirely indefensible as a matter of First Amendment law.” Id.  
 223. Id. at 378. 
 224. Id. at 377.  
 225. No. CV-03-1691-PHX-PGR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005).  
 226. Id. at *3–5.  
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administrative process set forth in statute.227 In accordance with the 
statute, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) evaluated whether 
AZLC met the organizational standards to qualify for a specialty plate: a 
service-oriented and nondiscriminatory primary activity or interest, not 
promoting a specific product or brand, and not promoting a specific 
religion.228 Finding that AZLC met these requirements, the DMV 
forwarded the group’s application to the License Plate Commission (the 
Commission),229 vested with the responsibility to decide “whether to 
authorize [specialty] plates.”230 The Commission denied the application, 
“concerned that other groups, with differing abortion-related viewpoints, 
would also apply for a license plate.”231  
Ultimately, the Stanton court held that Arizona’s denial of AZLC’s 
“Choose Life” application was acceptable as viewpoint-neutral. First, 
however, the court analyzed whether the speech on Arizona’s specialty 
license plates was governmental or private in nature, employing the four-
factor test.232 With regard to the “primary purpose” factor, the court 
reasoned that the purpose of Arizona’s specialty plate scheme was 
primarily governmental.233 The plates served the “central” function of 
vehicle identification.234 In addition, while the message on Arizona plates 
indicated a measure of private expression, the state had legislated 
standards to control which organizations could receive a specialty plate.235 
Regarding the “editorial control” and “ultimate responsibility” factors, the 
court again focused on the statutory standards an organization has to meet 
to qualify for a plate.236 In the court’s view, these standards established the 
state’s editorial control over and ultimate responsibility for the plates.237 
 
 
 227. Id. at *3–4. The statute which delineates the application process for a specialty plates is ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404 (2003).  
 228. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *2–3. The standards are set forth in ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-2404(B) (2003). In addition, an organization either had to have at least two hundred 
members or agree to pay the “production and program” costs of the plate. § 28-2404(G)(2).  
 229. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *3.  
 230. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2405(D)(3) (2003). The Commission is composed of a variety 
of administrative department officials and two members of the community. § 28-2405(A). The 
Commission is also charged with, inter alia, prescribing the “color and design” of license plates. § 28-
2405(D)(1)–(4).  
 231. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *3. An organization that received approval from 
the Commission would be subject to additional statutory requirements regarding the submission of 
driver applications and fees to the state. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404(C) (2003).  
 232. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *7–17.  
 233. Id. at *11. 
 234. Id. at *10.  
 235. Id. at *10–11.  
 236. See id. at *12–14, *16–17.  
 237. See id.  
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Finally, the “literal speaker” factor was indeterminate because the court 
found the “license plate itself” to be the “literal speaker.”238  
The Stanton court further considered “whether license plates constitute 
a designated public forum or a nonpublic forum.”239 The court held that 
Arizona’s specialty plate scheme represented a nonpublic forum because 
the state had established a selective application process in order to obtain a 
plate, imposing standards on organizations applying for a plate.240 The 
court further held that Arizona’s exclusion of AZLC from the forum was 
viewpoint-neutral.241 The state was simply trying to avoid altogether the 
“politically sensitive arena of abortion politics.”242  
In the recent decision of Choose Life of Illinois v. White,243 an Illinois 
organization alleged that the state legislature’s repeated refusal to create a 
“Choose Life” plate represented viewpoint discrimination.244 In Illinois’ 
hybrid specialty plate creation process, no statute delineates a step-by-step 
procedure for the creation of specialty plates. However, a statute relating 
to the issuance of specialty plates provides that the Secretary of State (the 
Secretary) is not to authorize a new specialty plate unless ten thousand 
applications have been received.245 This statute also vests the Secretary 
with discretion to accept a smaller number of applications if sufficient to 
cover the state’s production-related costs.246 Another statute allows the 
Secretary to refuse to issue any plate with a confusing, misleading, or 
offensive combination of letters and numbers.247 The Secretary developed 
policies and practices regarding the issuance of specialty plates which 
went beyond these basic obligations. Specifically, the Secretary required 
that every application for a specialty plate be approved by the state 
 
 
 238. Id. at *16–17. The court reasoned that considering the license plate to be the literal speaker 
“implicate[d] government and private speech” because the state owned the license plate but it was 
mounted on a privately owned vehicle. Id.  
 239. Id. at *17.  
 240. Id. at *22.  
 241. Id. at *24. 
 242. Id. The court also rejected AZLC’s argument that the state had engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by vesting the Commission with “unbridled discretion” to reject specialty plate 
applications because it found no evidence that the Commission had engaged in the “sporadic abuse of 
power” by denying AZLC’s application. Id. at *26–27. See brief discussion of unbridled discretion at 
supra text accompanying notes 71–72.  
 243. No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007).  
 244. Id. at *3.  
 245. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-600 (West 2006). The statute also requires the Secretary to 
inform law enforcement of the appearance of the new plate. § 5/3-600(b).  
 246. § 5/3-600. Pursuant to this discretion, the Secretary reduced the number of required 
applications to 850. White, 2007 WL 178455, at *2.  
 247. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-405.2 (West 2006).  
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legislature and signed into law by the governor.248 In addition, the 
Secretary placed “sole responsibility” for plate “promotional materials” on 
the applicant organization.249 Two state senators had introduced several 
“Choose Life” bills over the course of two legislative sessions.250 
Although the legislature passed several other specialty plate bills, it 
refused to act on the “Choose Life” bill.251 The “politically controversial” 
message of the plate was the “undisputed” reason for its de facto denial.252  
Employing the four-factor test, the White court held that Illinois’ 
specialty plates represented private rather than governmental speech.253 
The court found that the “central purpose” of Illinois’ specialty plate 
system was to facilitate private expression while raising revenue for the 
state.254 The court relied on the facts that an additional fee was charged for 
the plate and a minimum number of applications required before 
production.255 The “editorial control” factor weighed in favor of private 
speech because the “Choose Life” message was crafted by a private 
organization, rather than the legislature, and the Secretary had delegated 
full responsibility for specialty plate promotional materials to private 
organizations.256 Finally, finding that the “literal speaker” and “ultimate 
responsibility” factors tipped toward private speech, the court emphasized 
that a specialty plate message was closely associated with an individual 
driver, who selected the plate at additional cost.257 Thus, relying on three 
of four factors, the court held that Illinois’ specialty license plates 
represented private speech.258  
In choosing to employ the four-factor test, the White court explicitly 
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s argument in Bredesen that the Supreme 
Court’s Johanns decision had supplanted the four-factor test.259 While the 
Sixth Circuit interpreted drivers purchasing the “Choose Life” plate as 
volunteering to display a state message,260 the Illinois district court viewed 
 
 
 248. White, 2007 WL 178455, at *2.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at *3.  
 251. Id. At the time of suit, Illinois had created approximately sixty specialty plates through 
individual statutes, twenty-seven of which were “sponsored” by private organizations. Id. at *1. 
 252. Id. at *3.  
 253. Id. at *7.  
 254. Id. at *4–5. 
 255. Id. at *5.  
 256. Id. at *6.  
 257. Id. (“Indeed, no one who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase “Choose 
Life” would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.”).  
 258. Id. at *7.  
 259. Id.  
 260. ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006).  
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them as “pay[ing] to give expression to their private causes and 
viewpoints.”261 The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning was “forced.”262  
Unlike the Rose, Bredesen, and Stanton courts, the White court did not 
separately consider whether Illinois had created a specialty plate speech 
forum. After concluding that the state’s specialty plates represented private 
speech, the court apparently proceeded on the assumption that a forum had 
been created263 and considered whether Illinois had discriminated against 
the viewpoint expressed on the “Choose Life” plate.264 The court held that 
the state “wishe[d] to suppress what it considers a controversial idea.”265 
Refusing to create a specialty plate “[w]hen a group, such as Choose Life 
Illinois, has met the numerical and financial requirements of the specialty 
plate program . . . is to discriminate against those who hold a pro-life 
viewpoint.”266  
IV. ANALYSIS: HOW THE “CHOOSE LIFE” PLATE COURTS HAVE DECIDED 
WHETHER VIEWPOINT-SELECTIVE ACTIONS SHOULD BE JUSTIFIED AS 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
In both solo plate and plate rejection cases, courts analyzing the 
applicability of government speech have improperly analyzed or obscured 
a crucial issue: whether a state’s specialty license plate creation process 
has been opened as a speech forum. Courts in the solo plate cases 
improperly focused on the “Choose Life” plate alone, rather than the 
broader specialty plate creation process. Courts in the plate rejection cases 
examined facts relating to the states’ specialty plate schemes but did so 
under the circuit-developed four-factor test, rather than the forum creation 
framework set forth in Cornelius. The appropriate method of analyzing 
whether a state’s preference for or against the “Choose Life” plate should 
be constitutionally legitimated as government speech is to examine the 
 
 
 261. White, 2007 WL 178455, at *7. 
 262. Id.  
 263. See id. at *7–8 (ending a paragraph with “[Illinois] specialty license plates constitute[] 
private speech” and beginning the next paragraph with “[w]here the government voluntarily provides a 
forum for private expression, the government may not discriminate”).  
 264. Id. at *8.  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at *8. Choose Life of Illinois had met the numerical requirement by collecting signatures 
of approximately 35,000 people indicating that they would apply for a “Choose Life” plate if available. 
See Illinois Choose Life, Status Report, http://www.ilchoose-life.org/status_report.htm (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2007).  
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state’s specialty plate creation process under the Cornelius factors relating 
to governmental intent in forum creation.267  
A. Solo “Choose Life” Plate Cases  
Two of the “Choose Life” plate courts adjudicated a solo plate case, in 
which a state’s creation of a “Choose Life” plate without a pro-choice 
counterpart was alleged to be viewpoint discriminatory. The Fourth 
Circuit in Rose and the Sixth Circuit in Bredesen reached opposite 
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of a solo plate.268 Yet, both 
courts failed to take proper account of the respective state’s broader 
specialty plate creation process. Although they employed different legal 
tests, both courts focused on the “Choose Life” plate in isolation by 
considering whether its message was governmental or private in nature. 
This single-plate focus spilled over into the courts’ analyses of whether a 
speech forum had been created. Rather than examining facts relating to the 
specialty plate creation process, both courts focused on the motives of 
individual drivers who chose to display the “Choose Life” plate. 
Ultimately, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits reached different outcomes by 
emphasizing a different aspect of the complex motive of such drivers.  
1. The Four-Factor Test and the Johanns Test Both Lead Courts to 
View the “Choose Life” Plate in Isolation 
The Fourth Circuit in Rose and Sixth Circuit in Bredesen disagreed on 
whether to employ the four-factor test or the Supreme Court’s recent 
Johanns decision to evaluate the nature of the speech of the “Choose Life” 
plate.269 However, while only the four-factor test takes account of the fact 
that drivers choose to display the plate, the two tests both inquire into facts 
regarding the individual “Choose Life” plate, rather than the broader 
license plate scheme. 
Under the four-factor test, the first two factors inquire into the purpose 
of the challenged speech and the state’s degree of editorial control over it. 
Under the purpose factor, the Rose court focused on the South Carolina’s 
motive for legislatively creating a “Choose Life” plate,270 while the 
Bredesen court evaluated whether or not Tennessee set the “overall 
 
 
 267. See infra Part V.A for development of this argument.  
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 179, 203.  
 269. See ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (explicitly declining to rely on the 
“pre-Johanns four-factor test” utilized in Rose). 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 186–88.  
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message” of the plate.271 Essentially, both courts inquired into the extent to 
which the states were committed to the pro-life viewpoint and found facts 
pointing toward government speech.272 Rose and Bredesen also examined 
the states’ degree of control over the substantive content of the “Choose 
Life” plate. Although Rose labeled this factor “editorial control” and 
Bredesen termed it “final approval authority,” both courts found that the 
facts regarding substantive control indicated government speech.273 
However, under the “literal speaker” and “ultimate responsibility” factors 
of the four-factor test, the Rose court additionally considered the fact that 
drivers chose to pay extra in order to display the “Choose Life” plate. This 
fact, which also figures prominently in the court’s forum creation analysis, 
led the Rose court to find that private speech interests were also implicated 
by the “Choose Life” plate.  
2. Regarding Forum Creation, Courts Focus on the Motives of 
Individual Drivers  
Considering whether the respective states had created a specialty plate 
speech forum, the Rose and Bredesen courts each focused on a different 
motive of the driver who purchases and displays a “Choose Life” plate. In 
concluding that South Carolina had created a forum, the Fourth Circuit in 
Rose focused on drivers’ self-expressive motives in displaying the 
“Choose Life” plate. A key fact supporting the court’s conclusion was that 
drivers freely chose to display the “Choose Life” plate without 
compensation from the state; quite the reverse, drivers paid extra into state 
coffers for the plate.274 On this ground, the court distinguished Rust, where 
the government’s control over a message conveyed by individuals was 
held permissible. The Rust doctors were hired to convey the state’s pro-
life message. This crucial distinction revealed that South Carolina drivers 
who selected the “Choose Life” plate were not government agents. Self-
expression, communicating their deeply held beliefs, was their motive.  
 
 
 271. See supra text accompanying note 214.  
 272. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [‘Choose 
Life’ statute’s] purpose is to promote the State’s preference for the pro-life position . . . .”); Bredesen, 
441 F.3d at 376 (“[‘Choose Life’] is Tennessee’s own message.”).  
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 189, 215; Rose, 361 F.3d at 793 (“[T]he legislature 
determined that the plate will bear the message ‘Choose Life.’”); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376 
(“[Tennessee has] the right to wield final approval authority over every word used on the ‘Choose 
Life’ plate.”) (internal quotation omitted).  
 274. Rose, 361 F.3d at 798.  
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By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Bredesen concluded that Tennessee 
had not created a specialty plate speech forum when it offered a solo 
“Choose Life” plate. The Bredesen court also relied on the fact that drivers 
voluntarily choose to display the “Choose Life” plate at additional cost.275 
However, Bredesen interpreted the constitutional significance of this fact 
very differently from Rose. In the Bredeson court’s view, this 
demonstrated a driver’s desire to cooperate with the state in disseminating 
a state-authored message. While the Rose court viewed as central the fact 
that the Rust doctors were hired, the Bredesen court hypothesized that 
even volunteer doctors would have been compelled to convey the 
government’s anti-abortion message.276 The Bredesen court then 
analogized Tennessee drivers displaying the “Choose Life” plate to the 
hypothetical volunteer doctors in Rust.277 The drivers’ willingness to 
promote the message “Choose Life” without pay did not alter its 
governmental character or create a speech forum.  
3. The Solo Plate Courts Fail to Consider Whether the States’ 
Specialty Plate Creation Processes Are Speech Fora 
Although Rose and Bredesen interpret differently the fact that drivers 
voluntarily select the “Choose Life” plate, in a sense, both courts’ 
interpretations are correct. Each focuses on a desire truly motivating a 
driver who displays a “Choose Life” plate on his or her vehicle. In reality, 
such a driver has a complex motive, desiring to express his or her own 
pro-life beliefs, as Rose highlighted, and to share them with others, as 
Bredesen emphasized. Yet, the outcome for a plaintiff in a “Choose Life” 
plate case should not turn on which aspect of this motive strikes the 
court’s fancy as it analyzes the plate in isolation from the broader specialty 
plate scheme. When both courts focus on the individual “Choose Life” 
plate and drivers’ motives for displaying it, they miss the bigger picture of 
what is happening in the respective state’s specialty plate system as a 
whole.  
The analysis of the Rose court leads to the conclusion that a state 
inevitably opens a forum for speech simply by offering specialty license 
plates. Drivers will always select and pay extra only for plates related to 
causes they wish to promote. This one-size-fits-all reasoning does not 
focus on the actor who has power to create a public forum. An individual’s 
 
 
 275. See supra text accompanying note 223.  
 276. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378.  
 277. Id.  
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own decision to use government property for expressive purposes does not 
create a forum. As the Supreme Court explained in Cornelius, a key 
element of forum creation is manifest governmental intent to invite 
individuals to use state-owned property for speech.278 Moreover, post-Rust 
government speech cases indicate that even where private individuals are 
not strictly government agents, their participation with the government in 
expressive activity does not of itself mean that the government has opened 
a public forum. The Supreme Court in Forbes reasoned that public 
broadcasting was generally not a public forum even though programming 
was full of private speakers.279 Similarly, in Finley, Congress did not 
create a speech forum by authorizing competitive grants for artists.280 
Thus, the fact that the displaying of specialty plates is unquestionably 
expressive activity by individuals does not necessarily mean that the 
state’s specialty plate creation process constitutes a speech forum. Instead, 
an individualized analysis should be undertaken to determine whether a 
state intended to open its specialty plate creation process as a speech 
forum. This inquiry should track the governmental intent factors laid out 
in Cornelius: the compatibility of specialty plates with expressive activity, 
the state’s policy regarding its specialty plates, and the state’s real life 
practice with respect to the plates.281  
Bredesen’s analysis is problematic because it does not provide a 
principled way to distinguish between individuals acting as “volunteers” in 
spreading a governmental message and individuals speaking for 
themselves. The court’s reasoning that drivers displaying the “Choose 
Life” plate are volunteering for the state rests on its prior determination, 
relying on Johanns, that “Choose Life” is a governmental message.282 
Presumably, if “Choose Life” represented private speech, then drivers 
would not become government “volunteers” by displaying the plate; they 
would be exercising the right of free speech. 
The Bredesen court invoked Rust for the proposition that dissemination 
of a governmental message by volunteer citizens does not “create” a forum 
for speech.283 The logical flaw in this reasoning is that it does not account 
for the possibility that the state may be using individuals to spread its 
message in a speech forum already existing. In other words, it is possible 
 
 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.  
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 132–33.  
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 141–45.  
 281. See supra text accompanying note 80–81.  
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 216.  
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 220–22. 
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for a state to open its specialty plate scheme as a speech forum, despite the 
fact that an individual plate, such as “Choose Life,” represents a 
government-crafted message when viewed in isolation.284 Bredesen’s 
holding that volunteer dissemination of a governmental message allows 
the state to exclude opposing viewpoints from a specialty plate greatly 
expands the government speech doctrine in a way unjustified by Rust or 
Johanns.  
Rust tied the government’s ability to limit the clinic doctors’ speech to 
the fact that the government was financially subsidizing a limited 
program.285 In a proviso, the Rust Court explicitly noted that when the 
government “subsidizes” individual speakers by offering physical property 
for their use, the First Amendment rights of the speakers are implicated.286 
If the government has created a speech forum through an offering of 
physical property, then it must be viewpoint-neutral.287 In Johanns, the 
Court did not need to analyze whether a speech forum had been created 
through the generic beef advertising campaign because the plaintiff 
producers did not allege viewpoint discrimination.288 They complained of 
First Amendment harm through compelled subsidy and compelled 
speech.289 Neither of these compulsion-based arguments required inquiry 
into whether the government had created a forum for speech. The 
legitimacy of a compelled subsidy turns solely on the governmental or 
private identity of the subsidized speaker. While the government may 
compel citizens to pay for its own speech, it cannot mandate the 
subsidization of private speech.290 Compelled speech is never justified; the 
success of this claim depends on whether or not the compulsion was 
real.291 By contrast, the legitimacy of a viewpoint-based action is unrelated 
to compulsion and does not turn solely on the governmental or private 
nature of a challenged message.292 The dispositive question is whether or 
not the government has created a forum for speech. To apply Johanns as 
the “authoritative test” for government speech no matter what type of 
 
 
 284. See ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s analysis is “misleading” because it focuses on the “Choose Life” plate 
rather than the “broader license plate forum”).  
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09. 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 111–12.  
 287. See supra text accompanying note 112.  
 288. See supra text accompanying note 148.  
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 154–55.  
 290. See supra note 154. 
 291. See supra note 155.  
 292. See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“The majority errs by applying the 
compelled speech/subsidy doctrine in a case where nothing is compelled.”).  
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harm is alleged ignores prior Supreme Court cases involving government 
speech in the context of viewpoint discrimination. In these cases, such as 
Forbes, the Court carefully considered whether the government’s 
viewpoint-selective action could be justified on grounds of political 
accountability.293 
B. “Choose Life” Plate Rejection Cases 
Two of the “Choose Life” plate courts considered cases in which a 
state refused to offer the “Choose Life” plate. The differing conclusions of 
the courts in Stanton and White regarding the constitutionality of this 
action is due, at least in part, to their divergence on the factual question of 
whether the respective state was actually discriminating against the pro-
life viewpoint. However, both courts also considered whether government 
speech doctrine should apply, employing the four-factor test.294 The use of 
the four-factor test is analytically confusing in plate rejection cases. While 
in a solo plate case it leads to a focus on the “Choose Life” plate in 
isolation,295 courts in plate rejection cases necessarily consider facts 
regarding the state’s specialty creation process. This is due to the fact that 
no “Choose Life” plate exists. Yet, the four-factor test does not purport to 
determine whether or not the state’s specialty plate creation process has 
been opened as a forum. Rather, in setting forth the four-factor test, courts, 
including Stanton and White, declare that it distinguishes between 
“government” and “private” speech.296 When a “Choose Life” plate court 
is faced with a state arguing that exclusion of a viewpoint from a specialty 
plate is constitutionally permissible as its own speech, the appropriate 
question is whether a speech forum has been opened, requiring 
neutrality—not whether messages on specialty plates represent 
“government” or “private” speech as such. Stanton and White illustrate the 
 
 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 134. See also Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385 (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority apparently takes Johanns to mean that the sleeping doctrine of ‘government 
speech’ has been awakened and now controls all First Amendment analysis. I disagree.”).  
 294. See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, No. CV-03-1691-PHX-PGR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, 
at *7–17 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005); Choose Life of Ill. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455, at 
*4–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007.) 
 295. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 296. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, No. CV-03-1691-PHX-PGR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21960, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005); Choose Life of Ill. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007); Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th 
Cir. 2002). See also supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
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unhelpfulness of the four-factor test. Instead, Cornelius provides the 
proper framework in which to analyze forum creation.297  
1. The Use of the Four-Factor Test in Stanton Appears Unnecessary  
Applying the four-factor test to Arizona’s specialty plate scheme, the 
Stanton court first concluded that the state’s specialty plates displayed 
messages that were governmental, rather than private, in nature. The court 
proceeded to determine “whether license plates constitute a designated 
public forum or a nonpublic forum,”298 and concluded that a nonpublic 
forum existed. In both its four-factor analysis and its analysis relating to 
forum, the court cited essentially the same facts regarding Arizona’s 
administrative specialty plate creation process.299 Thus, the four-factor 
analysis appears unnecessary; the existence of a nonpublic forum requires 
viewpoint neutrality toward private speakers, even if government speech is 
also occurring within it.  
2. The Use of the Cornelius Factors Instead of the Four-Factor Test in 
White Would Sharpen the Court’s Analysis 
The White court concluded that Illinois’ specialty plates displayed 
messages that were private, rather than governmental, in nature by 
analyzing the state’s specialty plate scheme according to the four-factor 
test.300 Unlike Stanton, White did not consider as a separate question 
whether any type of speech forum existed. Rather, based on its conclusion 
that the plate messages were private speech, the court apparently assumed 
that a forum had been created.301 Because the court considered facts 
relating to Illinois’ specialty plate creation process under the four-factor 
test—not a single plate in isolation—this assumption appears valid. 
However, the Cornelius factors provide a better framework to analyze 
facts relating to specialty plate creation because they clearly signal that the 
question at issue is the existence of a speech forum rather than the nature 
of the speech on individual plates.  
 
 
 297. For development of this argument, see infra Part V.  
 298. Stanton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, at *17.  
 299. See id. at *8–17, *22 (relying on facts relating to standards applicable to organizations 
applying for specialty plates to support the four-factor analysis and forum analysis).  
 300. White, 2007 WL 178455, at *4–7. 
 301. See supra note 263. 
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V. PROPOSAL: FORUM-ACCOUNTABILITY ANALYSIS IN “CHOOSE LIFE” 
PLATE CASES 
A. Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate as 
Government Speech  
The question of whether a state’s viewpoint-based action regarding a 
“Choose Life” plate is constitutionally permissible as government speech 
should be decided in a manner more closely tied to the Supreme Court’s 
precedents regarding both public forum doctrine and government speech. 
This suggests that courts should consider whether a forum has been 
created and whether the government’s message is one for which it can be 
held politically accountable.  
The Supreme Court has not yet set forth a comprehensive test for when 
viewpoint-selective acts by government entities should be considered 
constitutionally legitimate as government speech. Instead, its government 
speech cases simply pinpoint instances of “yes” and “no.”302 Lower courts 
should not sweepingly analogize from the facts of these cases, where the 
government acted in such discrete roles as doctor,303 public broadcaster,304 
and funder of the arts,305 to wholly different factual situations. The 
imprimatur of government speech allows the exclusion of individual 
speech from government property. It thus threatens to overwhelm the 
carefully constructed public forum structure which free speech 
jurisprudence has traditionally erected around individuals.306 The Supreme 
Court has justified this potential danger on the ground that the government 
is politically accountable for its speech.307 Therefore, government speech 
 
 
 302. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 303. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990). 
 304. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).  
 305. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  
 306. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 82, at 1488–1501. The dangers of a broad concept of 
government speech include monopoly of a speech market, deception (government hiding its role as 
speaker) and distortion (government silencing other views). Id. Further, these dangers are difficult to 
limit.  
[G]iven the government’s power as speaker—the facts at its disposal, its resources, and its 
self-interest—it is likely that the people who receive the government’s message will not be in 
a position to act collectively to limit government speech. A telling example of this is the 
campaign finance system, which in reality represents a form of government-supported, self-
interested speech, which the ‘people’ collectively seem unable to control from the outside. 
Id. at 1504.  
 307. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001). See also supra text 
accompanying note 91 for a discussion of the political accountability rationale.    
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doctrine should be interpreted narrowly, tied to forum creation and 
accountability. 
In situations not closely analogous to a Supreme Court government 
speech case, courts should never sanction viewpoint selectivity as 
government speech without analyzing whether a speech forum has been 
created.308 This forum creation analysis309 should not focus on whether a 
particular speaker is governmental or private because the fact that a 
government entity may be “speaking” in a public forum does not give it 
constitutional license to exclude other speakers from the forum based on 
viewpoint.310 Instead, according to Cornelius, whether a forum has been 
created, requiring viewpoint neutrality, depends upon governmental intent 
regarding the property to which access is sought: either to invite 
individuals to use the property for expressive activity or to reserve the 
property for its own use.311 Cornelius sets forth three factors to guide the 
inquiry: the government’s policy regarding the property, its practice with 
respect to the property, and the compatibility of the property’s objective 
nature with expressive activity.312  
The Supreme Court’s government speech cases illustrate both the 
importance of governmental intent regarding its property and the existence 
of safeguards serving to hold the government politically accountable for 
 
 
 308. The tension between public forum doctrine and government speech has been recognized by 
lower courts in other government speech cases. See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of 
the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1095 n.11 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding the radio broadcasting speech at 
issue “sufficiently editorial in character to fall within the scope of Forbes,” thus obviating the need to 
distinguish between government speech and forum creation); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 
F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing the Ku Klux Klan court as “refusing to decide whether 
speech’s status as ‘government speech’ is enough to preclude forum analysis altogether” but 
concluding that “when a public high school is the speaker, its control of its own speech is not subject 
to the constraints of constitutional safeguards and forum analysis”).  
 309. The question whether a speech forum has been created should be a conceptually distinct 
question from which kind of forum has been created. If the court finds that the state has opened a 
speech forum, as opposed to reserving its property for state use, then the court may need to consider 
which kind of forum has been created. The Cornelius factors will also guide this inquiry. See supra 
Part II.A. for a discussion of Cornelius and the various types of speech fora. Viewpoint neutrality, 
however, is required in every type of forum, public or nonpublic. See supra text accompanying notes 
68, 73. If a state argued that its exclusion was based on subject matter rather than viewpoint, see infra 
note 319, then the type of forum would become relevant.  
 310. To help understand this point, consider a speech forum in a less abstract context than license 
plates: a public park, which is a traditional public forum. Imagine a city mayor giving a speech in the 
park, while protestors stand at the gate with signs. The Supreme Court has never held that the fact that 
the mayor is speaking in the park allows the city to exclude protestors from the park. In fact, Rust 
indicates that this would be impermissible. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199–200 (1991). Rust notes 
that providing physical property for the use of individual speakers does not allow the government to 
favor some over others. Id.  
 311. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 312. Id. at 803–04.  
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its viewpoint-selective message. In Rust and Finley, cases in which 
government speech defense was successful, the government arguably both 
manifested intent to reserve state-owned property for its own expressive 
use and remained politically accountable for the message expressed.313 In 
these cases, the government’s intention to use its funds to encourage 
childbirth and decent art, respectively, was clearly delineated in statute.314 
Additional accountability in Rust arguably stemmed from the fact that the 
clinic doctors were free to inform patients that abortion counsel was 
simply outside the scope of the clinic’s statutorily designated services.315  
Conversely, Forbes’s holding that candidate debates are not 
government speech relied on the fact that the government did not intend to 
speak, as the public broadcaster “implicit[ly]” disclaims the candidates’ 
speech as his own.316 Dicta in Forbes indicating that other types of public 
broadcasting are normally government speech relied on the fact that public 
broadcasters are more publicly accountable when not operating under the 
threat of viewpoint discrimination lawsuits.317 Also, in Rosenberger, the 
state university’s purpose in offering newspaper printing subsidies was to 
“encourage a diversity of views” from student groups.318 The school 
explicitly distanced itself from the opinions expressed by the groups. 
Thus, in sum, lower courts should allow government speech as a defense 
to alleged viewpoint discrimination only where a speech forum has not 
been created and the government is seeking to communicate a message for 
which it can be held politically accountable.319  
 
 
 313. See discussion of Rust and Finley supra text accompanying notes 92–113, 138–46.   
 314. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98, 139–40. 
 315. See supra text accompanying note 110.  
 316. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998). 
 317. Id. at 674–75.  
 318. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).  
 319. This Note argues that when these two conditions are not met, the state should not be able to 
justify viewpoint discrimination on the grounds of government speech. This does not mean, however, 
the state will necessarily be required to offer either a “Choose Life” or pro-choice plate. The state 
could also argue that its license plates are a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum and that the 
subject matter of abortion, whether from a pro-life or pro-choice perspective, is simply not included in 
the forum definition. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the limited 
public forum. It is unsettled whether excluding a plate because its subject matter is controversial 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Compare Choose Life Ill. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 
178455, *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that a state’s rejection of a “Choose Life” plate was 
based on its desire to “suppress what it considers a controversial idea” and thus the state was 
“discriminating against a viewpoint”), with Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, No. CV-03-1691-PHX-PGR, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21960, *25 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that a state’s rejection of a 
“Choose Life” plate was simply “steer[ing] clear of the abortion debate” without showing “political 
favoritism” to either side).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 409 Hake book pages.doc  1/23/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
450 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:409 
 
 
 
 
B. Forum-Accountability Analysis: Examining Forum Creation and 
Message Communication in the “Choose Life” Plate Context  
The concerns of preserving public forum doctrine and ensuring 
political accountability suggest a method by which “Choose Life” plate 
courts should analyze government speech. They should consider two 
questions, which can together be termed “forum-accountability analysis”: 
(1) whether the state has opened its specialty plate creation process as a 
speech forum by inviting individuals to express their views on specialty 
plates, and (2) whether the state’s viewpoint-based action—either offering 
or refusing to offer the plate—communicates a discernible message 
subject to political accountability. Viewpoint selectivity respecting the 
“Choose Life” plate should be justified as government speech only where 
the state has not created a speech forum and its viewpoint-based action 
clearly conveys a message for which the citizenry can hold it accountable.  
1. Forum Creation  
Whether the state has created a specialty plate speech forum depends 
on how it structures and administers its specialty license plate scheme. 
This reveals whether the state intended to open a speech forum or to 
reserve the plates for its own speech. According to Cornelius, the factors 
to consider are the government’s policy and practice regarding public 
access to its specialty plate creation process as well as the plates’ 
compatibility with expression. Under Cornelius, it would be possible for a 
state to create specialty plates under the legislative model of specialty 
plate creation without opening a speech forum; however, a state utilizing 
the administrative model necessarily opens a speech forum.  
The first step under Cornelius is to identify precisely the property 
which is the alleged speech forum. This is done with a view to where the 
plaintiff is seeking access.320 The plaintiff in a “Choose Life” plate case, 
whether pro-choice or pro-life, desires viewpoint-neutral access to the 
specialty license plate creation process. Thus, the relevant property is the 
state’s broader license plate scheme rather than any individual plate.  
Next, the state’s policy with regard to its specialty plates should be 
considered. In a state adopting the legislative model of specialty plate 
creation, the enabling statutes for specialty plates, which delineate their 
substantive message and earmark their revenues to specified organizations, 
 
 
 320. See supra text accompanying note 79.  
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evince a government policy to use specialty plates for the goals set forth. 
In essence, the state demonstrates intent to structure the specialty plate 
scheme to financially support organizations viewed as beneficial to the 
community. By contrast, a state following the administrative model of 
specialty plate creation thereby declares its purpose to allow members of 
the public to use specialty plates to promote their own causes. A statute 
setting forth a procedure by which nonprofit organizations can apply and 
receive a plate after meeting basic criteria is an invitation for public 
expression.321  
The state’s actual practice with regard to its specialty plates is the 
second factor to consider. If two specialty plates clearly contradict each 
other, this seems to indicate that the state has opened specialty plates as a 
forum for speech; self-contradiction does not seem an expressive purpose 
for which the government would reserve the plates. A state’s issuance of 
specialty plates having little or nothing to do with a legitimate 
governmental interest may also raise an inference of forum creation, at 
least if the state’s intent with respect to its plates is otherwise unclear.322 
The state’s marketing techniques are also a revealing source of clues 
regarding the state’s intent. If the state appeals to drivers’ desire for self-
expression, this looks like opening specialty plates for public expressive 
use.323 In this vein, promotional materials regarding specialty plates, such 
as inserts in vehicle registration mailings or transportation department 
websites, should be examined. Additional evidence of intent is whether 
ideas for specialty plates generally originate with the legislature or with 
private groups which lobby legislators.  
 
 
 321. See also Jacobs, supra note 30, at 447 (classifying the administrative specialty plate model as 
a forum for speech).  
 322. Judge Martin, dissenting in Bredesen, made this point by noting that Tennessee had issued 
specialty plates for the University of Florida, Tennessee’s “arch-rival” in football. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 
at 382 n.4 (Martin, J., dissenting). A circuit court which resolved a “Choose Life” dispute on standing 
grounds noted the relevance of a discernible governmental interest in specialty plate messages. See 
Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 946 n.9 (11th Cir. 2003) (“While none of the 
specialty plates [issued in Florida] represent an issue with which we think the State of Florida would 
disagree, neither do they universally concern issues of the greatest importance to the State. . . . We fail 
to divine sufficient government attachment to the messages on Florida specialty license plates to 
permit a determination that the messages represent government speech.”).  
 Similarly, one commentator has argued that government speech should be justified only in relation 
to issues “germane” to the state’s governance, importing the germaneness principle from compelled 
subsidy doctrine. See Note, supra note 94, at 2432. 
 323. Judge Martin, dissenting in Bredesen, highlighted such facts in Tennessee: the application for 
a specialty plate stated “Support your cause and community” and a governor’s press release described 
the plates as representing “drivers’ special interests.” Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 384 (Martin, J., 
dissenting).  
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Cornelius also instructs that the alleged forum’s compatibility with 
expression is relevant. This factor is the least helpful because it is hard to 
gauge in the specialty plate context. While some argue that the 
proliferation of specialty plates distorts their primary identification 
function,324 expression is clearly occurring on the plates, either by the state 
itself or by private speakers at the state’s invitation.  
If a state with a legislative specialty plate creation process consistently 
treats specialty plates as tools for its own expressive purposes, then a court 
should not find that the state has created a speech forum.325 However, if 
the state’s practice contradicts its policy and tends to show abdication of 
specialty plates to the public for speech, then a court should find that the 
specialty plate scheme is a forum for speech. If a forum exists, then 
discrimination toward the pro-life or pro-choice viewpoint should not be 
considered constitutional as government speech.  
2. Communication of a Discernible Message  
If the court finds that a state has reserved specialty plates for its own 
use rather than opening a forum, a second question is raised: whether the 
state’s viewpoint-based action respecting the “Choose Life” plate 
communicates a discernible message from the state to its citizenry. This 
element is crucial because citizens cannot hold government officials 
politically accountable for a policy of which they are unaware.  
In the case of a solo “Choose Life” plate, a court may find that the state 
is conveying a clear pro-life preference through the plate.326 The message 
of a solo “Choose Life” plate visibly stakes out the government’s position 
on abortion. The words “Choose Life” urge women of the state to carry 
pregnancies to term rather than to abort. Second, the enabling statute 
earmarks funds from sales of the plate to specific pro-life organizations. In 
addition, the statute may limit the use of the funds and explicitly render 
abortion-related organizations ineligible.327 This visible display and 
 
 
 324. See Editorial, License to Offend, supra note 1.  
 325. One scholar has argued that the legislative model of specialty plates is categorically 
unconstitutional because viewpoint discrimination is defined to include not only discriminatory access 
decisions but also control of a forum by government officials with unbridled discretion over access. 
See Jacobs, supra note 30, at 469. See also supra text accompanying notes 71–72. Although this Note 
argues that the legislative model of specialty plates may be operated without creating a forum, if the 
court does find that a specialty plate forum exists, this Author agrees that the legislature is an 
inappropriate body to manage it. To avoid viewpoint discrimination by unbridled discretion, the state 
should switch to an administrative model with clear statutory qualifications for specialty plate creation.  
 326. While no state has yet issued one, the same would be true of a solo pro-choice plate.  
 327. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
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specific enactment of a clear policy preference, backed up by financial 
appropriation, tends to promotes political debate and attract media 
attention.328 
The factors supporting the solo “Choose Life” plate as government 
speech—the “Choose Life” display, statutory designation of policy, and 
the financial earmark—serve to limit the government speech doctrine. 
They ensure that the state cannot simply convert all viewpoint-based 
decisions into government speech by redefining exclusions from its 
property as broad, ambiguous policy goals.329 
 
 
 328. See supra note 1.  
 329. For example, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 
(1995), held that a state university engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination by broadly 
offering funding to student groups but specifically denying funding for their “religious activities.” See 
supra text accompanying notes 115–20. Imagine that a university phrases a similar policy not as a ban 
on religious activities but instead as a goal of funding student groups which “contribute to intellectual 
development and achievement.” Then, a university official denies funding to a religious group for its 
student newspaper, explaining that the group’s view of ultimate truth tends to repress intellectual 
development.  
 In this hypothetical, the university will not be able to justify its policy on the grounds of 
“government speech” because the policy does not clearly advocate one point of view over another. The 
goal of “intellectual development” is much more ambiguous in meaning than “Choose Life.” Further, 
the decision as to which groups receive funding is made on a case-by-case basis at an administrative 
level, rather than designated in a statute as a matter of public record. Thus, in this Rosenberger-type 
hypothetical, the government entity has not visibly identified itself with a discernible message and thus 
lacks accountability for its viewpoint-based decisions.  
 For a recent, real-life example of the danger of a broad view of government speech without a 
consideration of forum creation or accountability, consider People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The District of Columbia Arts Commission (the 
Commission) sponsored an art project to showcase animal art of a “festive and whimsical” nature. Id. 
at 26. The project included both an artistic competition and a sponsorship component, in which 
exhibits could be sponsored for $5,000. Id. The Commission announced that it would “reserve[] the 
right of design approval” over exhibits. Id. PETA submitted an application with $5,000 to sponsor an 
exhibit depicting a sad elephant, a circus victim. Id. Other exhibits accepted by the Commission 
included references to the “butterfly ballot” and September 11. Id. at 27. PETA’s application was 
rejected, as inconsistent with the “goals, spirit, and theme” of the art project. Id. at 26.  
 The court upheld the rejection. Id. at 31. It cited Forbes and Finley, which speak of the 
government’s need to exercise “journalistic discretion” and “make aesthetic judgments.” Id. at 29 
(quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998); Nat’l Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998)). The court then stated: “The same is true here.” Id. It did 
not consider whether there were differences between the government’s role as public broadcaster or 
funder of the arts which could reduce accountability for viewpoint-based decisions. The court 
highlighted the fact that the Commission had “reserved the right” to approve design, id. at 30, but did 
not consider whether the rejection decisions made pursuant to this discretion would clearly 
communicate a message of “festiveness” to the public, given the fact that other political exhibits had 
been allowed. As in the Rosenberger-type hypothetical, the Commission’s viewpoint-based decisions 
were made at a less visible administrative level and did not communicate a discernible message to the 
public. Under the proposed forum-accountability analysis, such decisions would not qualify as 
government speech. For a contrary view on this point, see Dolan, supra note 65, at 111 (arguing that 
the government speech paradigm should replace forum analysis in certain situations in which the 
government has “broad and thematic” policy goals).  
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By contrast, the refusal to offer a “Choose Life” or a pro-choice plate 
where no abortion-related plate yet exists does not send any intelligible 
message to the public, and therefore, should not constitute government 
speech. Consider: in a state in which a mix of specialty plates have been 
created legislatively, none relating to abortion, a driver would not draw 
any conclusions regarding the state’s preference on abortion. Nor would 
he or she conclude that the state was unconcerned with the issue. The 
absence of an abortion-related plate simply sends no message from the 
state regarding abortion. Thus, even when a state has not opened its 
specialty plates as a speech forum, refusing to offer either a “Choose Life” 
or a pro-choice plate should not be justified as government speech unless a 
plate from the opposite viewpoint already exists.  
C. Applying Forum-Accountability Analysis to a Hybrid Model of 
Specialty Plate Creation 
When specialty license plates are created through a process integrally 
involving both the legislature and an administrative agency, the question 
of whether the state has opened a forum may be more difficult to answer. 
In order to flesh out the proposed forum-accountability analysis, it is 
helpful to see how it applies to such hybrid models of specialty plate 
creation. Missouri provides a useful illustration.  
A Missouri statute allows organizations to “initially petition” the 
Department of Revenue (DOR) “to establish a new specialty license 
plate.”330 Eligible organizations must be registered as nonprofits and agree 
to use revenues from the plate to carry out their “charitable mission.”331 
The organization must also secure a legislative “sponsor,” a member of the 
state legislature.332 The DOR maintains a downloadable application on its 
website for nonprofit organizations to complete, thereby initiating the 
specialty plate creation process.333 The DOR then forwards the application 
to a legislative committee, the Joint Committee on Transportation 
 
 
 Nor did the court analyze whether the Commission created a speech forum through its policy and 
practice regarding the sponsorship component of the project. Although the Commission’s apparent 
policy was to maintain a festive theme, PETA argued that by allowing other politically themed 
exhibits in practice, the Commission had created a forum for speech. Id. at 28. PETA persuaded the 
district court on this point. Id.  
 330. MO. ANN. STAT. § 301.3150 (West 2006). 
 331. § 301.2999(3). 
 332. § 301.3150(1)(1). 
 333. See Missouri Department of Revenue, Specialty License Plate Development Process, 
http://dor.mo.gov/mvdl/motorv/plateprocess/ (follow “DOR-5052” hyperlink under “Initial 
Application” section) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).  
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Oversight (the Committee).334 The Committee reviews each application 
“for approval or denial.”335 The Committee may not approve an 
application if either five representatives or two senators sign a petition 
opposing it.336 If the Committee denies an application, the organization 
has fifteen days to request a hearing for review.337 If the Committee 
approves a plate, it is subsequently authorized in a statute.338 Missouri 
specialty plates include those benefiting the Alpha Phi Omega National 
Service Fraternity339 and the Missouri 4-H.340 
The following facts tend to indicate that Missouri has a policy of 
retaining specialty plates for its own speech: a legislative committee has 
statutory authority to approve or to deny all specialty plate applications 
and it considers the views of other legislators. Yet, this policy seems 
contradicted by the statute which allows nonprofit organizations to 
“initially petition”341 for a plate, thereby inviting a subset of the public to 
use state-owned plates for expression. Additionally, in practice, specialty 
plate ideas originate with private groups rather than the legislature. That 
the DOR provides easy access to a plate application on its website further 
supports this inference of forum creation. Combined with the fact that 
specialty plates are available for causes that seem more relevant to private 
than governmental interests, it appears that at least Missouri’s practice, if 
not policy, is to allow individuals to express their views through specialty 
license plates. Thus, the state has created speech forum and should not be 
able to justify viewpoint-based rejections of specialty plate applications as 
government speech.342 
 
 
 334. § 301.3150(7). 
 335. § 21.795(6). 
 336. Id.  
 337. § 301.3152. 
 338. See §§ 301.2999 to 301.4000 (authorizing specialty plates).  
 339. § 301.3137.  
 340. § 301.481.  
 341. § 301.3150.  
 342. Choose Life of Missouri submitted an application to the Department of Revenue in June 
2005. Choose Life of Missouri, http://www.ecognizant.net/chooselife/show_page.tcl?org_id= 
12&page_type=0 (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). According to the complaint filed in June 2006 by 
Choose Life of Missouri, two state senators submitted a letter to the committee opposing the 
application. Complaint ¶ 43, Choose Life of Mo. v. Vincent, No. 06-443-CV-W-SOW (W.D. Mo. filed 
June 1, 2006), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/VincentComplaint.pdf. It was denied in 
February 2006, and again, after review, in May 2006. Id. ¶¶ 47–51.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Specialty license plates are a creative, effective, and popular way for 
states to advocate causes and raise money for organizations serving their 
citizens. Yet, their constitutional status is unclear. Federal courts disagree 
over whether it is constitutional for a state to offer or reject a “Choose 
Life” plate because of the abortion-related viewpoint it expresses. While 
the Supreme Court has chosen to remain silent on the “Choose Life” plate 
question, its precedents regarding public forum doctrine and government 
speech serve as guide to constructing an intelligible framework for the 
evaluation of “Choose Life” plate cases.  
Under the proposed forum-accountability framework, a “Choose Life” 
plate court should consider two questions. First, the court should consider 
whether the state has created a specialty plate speech forum, examining the 
state’s policy and practice regarding its specialty license creation process. 
Second, the court should consider whether the state’s viewpoint-based 
action regarding the “Choose Life” plate communicates a discernible 
message regarding abortion. Only if a forum has not been created and a 
discernible message regarding abortion is communicated should 
viewpoint-based action be justified as government speech. In this way, 
both individual citizens, through their First Amendment speech, and the 
state, through politically accountable advocacy, can have a say in the 
continuing community dialogue about life and all its choices. 
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